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Patterns of Injustice:
Police Brutality in the Courts
SUSAN BANDESt
INTRODUCTION

Legal consequences often hinge on whether events or
incidents are categorized as isolated or connected,
individual or systemic, anecdotal or part of a larger pattern.
Courts tend to portray incidents of police brutality as
anecdotal, fragmented, and isolated rather than as part of a
numerous
Though
pattern.
institutional
systemic,
doctrines-including federalism, separation of powers,
causation, deference, discretion, and burden of proofprovide partial explanations for the judicial fragmentation
of police misconduct, it seems clear that courts cannot or do
not choose to see systemic patterns for reasons that
transcend doctrinal explanations. This article explores
those reasons, which, ultimately, are relevant not only to
police brutality, but to the larger judicial tendency to
anecdotalize systemic government misconduct.
It is inevitable that courts must decide which details,
events, and persona are relevant to a particular story of
police conduct. Every narrative highlights some details, and
downplays or discards others that seem to threaten its
tProfessor, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Albert Alschuler,
Erwin Chemerinsky, Paul Chevigny, John Conroy, Barry Friedman, Tom
Geraghty, Jeffrie Murphy, Judith Resnik, Sharon Rush, Carol Sanger, Austin
Sarat, Stephen Siegel, David Sklansky, Welsh White, and George Wright for
their comments on drafts of this paper. I also received very helpful comments at
faculty workshops at the Cornell, University of Colorado and DePaul Law
Schools, at the 1998 meeting of the Working Group on Law, Culture and the
Humanities at Georgetown Law Center, and at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the
Law and Society Association in Aspen, Colorado. Thanks are also due to
Michael Carter, Patty Galvan, Tom McGuire, Rebecca Morse, and Manuel Rupe
for their excellent research assistance, and the DePaul Law School Faculty
Research Fund for its support.
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coherence. However, the particular decisions courts make
are neither inevitable nor mechanically made. These
decisions are influenced, explicitly and implicitly, by factors
that are political, social, psychological, and cultural. There
are many such factors that lead courts to mask or discount
systemic harm. Sometimes, courts cannot see connections
because of conscious or preconscious assumptions and
expectations about how the story should be told, what ought
to be part of the story, or how the characters will behave.
This article will seek to explore some of those assumptions.
The question I want to address is why this particular
story, the story of police brutality, is so often anecdotalized.
Police brutality is different in kind and degree from police
misconduct, examples of which include conducting an
unlawful search or using unnecessary force. Police brutality
is conduct that is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad
faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its target.
It is described as "conscious and venal,... directed against

persons of marginal status and credibility," and "committed
by officers who often take great pains to conceal their
conduct."' Police brutality is longstanding, pervasive, and
alarmingly resilient. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of
its resilience is the extent to which it depends on the
complicity of multiple governmental actors, including the
courts.
Consider the example of ongoing police torture in the
City of Chicago. During a period of at least thirteen years,
more than sixty men, all of them black, have alleged that
they were physically abused, and in fact, tortured, by
several named officers in the Area Two Violent Crimes Unit
on Chicago's South Side.2 Certain types of torture, by
certain officers, were alleged repeatedly, including
suffocation with a typewriter cover, electroshock with a
specially constructed black box, hanging by handcuffs for
hours, a cattle prod to the testicles, and Russian roulette
1. JAMES SKOLNICK & JAMES J.

FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE

EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 19 (1993).
2. See John Conroy, Poison in the System, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE
WEEKLY, June 25, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, Poison]; John Conroy, The
Shocking Truth, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Conroy, Shocking Truth]; John Conroy, Town Without Pity,
READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, Jan. 12, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, Town
Without Pity]; John Conroy, House of Screams, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE
WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, House of Screams].
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with a gun in the suspect's mouth.3 The allegations were
corroborated not only by defense attorneys and emergency
room physicians, but by several other respected groups
including a broad- based Chicago citizens' coalition, an
investigative group from the internal police review agency,
and Amnesty International.4 In a number of cases,
defendants alleged that they were tortured into confessing.
Yet despite the fact that the same group of Area Two
officers was named again and again, and despite the
startling similarity in methods alleged, the courts, with few
exceptions, failed to see a pattern.5 Indeed, appellate courts
upheld several rulings that prevented the identification of
just such a pattern.6 Ten of the defendants are on death row
today.7 In civil cases against the officers and the City of
Chicago, the failure to introduce prior acts of brutality
paved the way for a rejection of a finding of municipal
liability.8 Although one of the officers, Commander John
Burge (the creator of the infamous black box), was

3. See infra text accompanying notes 111-39.
4. See Conroy, Town Without Pity, supra note 2, at 14, 21.
5. See, e.g., People v. Hobley, 637 N.E.2d 992 (IlM. 1994); People v. Patterson,
610 N.E.2d 16 (IIl. 1992); People v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044 (Ill. 1991); People
v. Hinton, 1998 WL 909738 (iI. App. Ct. 1998); People v. Holmes, 556 N.E.2d.
539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1990). But see People
v. Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (reversing prior opinion
upholding conviction, at 502 N.E.2d 345 (IM. Ap. Ct. 1986) and allowing a
rehearing to suppress a defendant's confession based on prior allegations of
police brutality at Area Two because this evidence was deemed "relevant to
Cannon's claim that he was tortured"); People v. Bates, 642 N.E.2d 774 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a defendant's confession would be suppressed
based on "alleged systematic abuse of suspects in custody at Area Two police
headquarters, where the defendant was interrogated"); People v. Banks, 549
N.E.2d 766 (Ill. Ap. Ct. 1989) (holding that evidence that same officers had used
same coercive techniques on another suspect was inadmissible at suppression
hearing).
6. See, e.g., People v. Orange, 659 N.E.2d 935, 941 (1ll. 1995) (refusing to
find ineffectiveness of counsel when attorney failed to investigate reports that
officers who had allegedly tortured the suspect he represented had engaged in a
pattern of such torture in similar cases); People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 37
(Ill. 1993) (upholding exclusion of police disciplinary files showing pattern of
similar complaints against same officer).
7. See Editorial, ProbingBurge, CI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999 at 35. See
also Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, A Tortured Path to Death Row, CH. TRiB.,
Nov. 17, 1999, at 1 (noting that the city has yet to undertake a full-scale
investigation of the Area Two tactics and whether they led to wrongful
convictions).
8. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d. 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
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ultimately expelled from the force, other officers involved
continued to progress through the ranks, garnering nothing
but commendations and promotions.'
It would be comforting to dismiss the story of Area Two
as
unusual,
anecdotal,
and
unrepresentative.
Unfortunately, in many significant respects, what
happened at Area Two represents business as usual in
Chicago and throughout the United States." Official
reactions to police brutality fall into a familiar pattern. The
violence inflicted on Rodney King," Malice Green," Abner
Louima 3 and Amadou Diallo4 (the unarmed West African
immigrant in New York City who died in a hail of 41 police
bullets) was, predictably, followed by police assurances that
it was an aberration, the work of a few rotten apples, a
criminal act rather than routine police conduct.'
In most cases, the view of police brutality as
aberrational (or even justified) shapes the conduct of every
institution responsible for dealing with the problem,
including police command, review boards, administrative
agencies, city, state and federal government, and the courts.
This view allows police brutality to flourish in a number of
ways, including making it easier to discount individual
stories of police brutality, and weakening the case for any
kind of systemic reform. The fragmentation of systemic
police brutality needs to be addressed at many institutional
levels. This article is particularly, though not exclusively,
concerned with how and why that fragmentation occurs in
the courts.
The fragmentation takes several forms and is
accomplished through numerous doctrinal means. Often,
police engaged in incidents of brutality have a history of

9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY

AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (1998) [hereinafter SHIELDED
FROM JUSTICE].

10. The existence of a longstanding police torture ring is unusual in the
present-day United States. However, many aspects of the brutality and the
institutional response to it were not at all unusual. See text accompanying notes

198-221.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See
See
See
See
See

25, 46-47.

infra text accompanying notes 39-47.
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 175-77.
infra text accompanying notes 52-63.
infra text accompanying notes 64-65.
infra notes 65-71; see also SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at
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such incidents, 6 departments house several officers
engaged in similar types of brutality or corruption, or the
brutality is concentrated in a single neighborhood."
However, there are innumerable hurdles to identifying or
documenting such patterns. Complaints are discouraged, 8
confessions are not videotaped, 9 record keeping is lax or
nonexistent," records are sealed or expunged, 'patterns are
not tracked," and police files are deemed undiscoverable. 3
If a history of past incidents does exist and, despite these
hurdles, becomes known to the brutality victim, he faces
additional hurdles introducing evidence of the brutality in
court, including restrictive evidentiary rulings,24 protective
orders, 5 judicial toleration of police peijury or of "the blue
wall of silence,"6 assumptions about credibility that favor
police officers,
the absolute immunity of testifying
officers, substantive constitutional doctrines insulating

16. See infra Part I.A.
17. For example, the Mollen Commission reported on several situations in
which virtually an entire police precinct was engaged in patterns of corruption
and brutality directed at particular neighborhoods. See REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1994) [hereinafter
MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Clifford Krauss, Command Failures:

Mollen Report Blames Gap in Responsibility for Rogue Officers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1994, at Al.
18. See infra notes 85-91.
19. See Editorial, Let the Cameras Roll, CI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1999, at 16
(calling on Chicago Police Department to begin videotaping confessions);
Lorraine Forte, Cops Prepare to Videotape Confessions, CI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 2,
1998, at 1 (detailing plan to institute limited videotaping of confessions in
Chicago, in the wake of allegations that two young boys, later exonerated, were
coerced into confessing in the absence of parents or attorneys).
20. See infra notes 101-04, 209, 214.
21. See id.; see also SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 46-49
(discussing

barriers

to

obtaining

investigative

and

personnel

records

documenting prior incidents of brutality).
22. See infra notes 209, 214 and accompanying text.

23. See Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 USC § 1983 is
Ineffective in DeterringPoliceBrutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 761-62 (1993).
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See infra note 349.
26. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as
Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U.
PITT. L. REV. 232 (1998); Morgan Cloud, Judges, 'Testilying' and the
Constitution,69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1341 (1996); infra notes 324-329.
27. See infra notes 289-91, 316, 355-63.
28. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
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failures to acte9 or demanding an exceptionally high level of
proof of wrongdoing,"0 restrictive municipal liability
standards coupled with a lack of receptivity to evidence of
systemic wrongdoing,"' and standing doctrines that make
injunctive relief nearly impossible to obtain.2
In police brutality cases, the routine categorizing of
incidents as isolated rather than systemic has had terrible
consequences. Systematic police brutality has been masked,
insulated, and implicitly condoned because courts have
failed to make connections among incidents; failed to make
causal links between police conduct and the injuries and
confessions of suspects; denied litigants or juries access to
information which would enable linkages to be discovered;
and in general persisted in defining encounters as separate
from-and irrelevant to-any overarching systemic patterns
that need to be addressed.
Part I examines the phenomenon of police brutality,
paying particular attention to the ways in which patterns
are masked. Section A takes a highly detailed look at one
"pocket" in which police brutality and even torture have
long thrived-Chicago's Area Two Violent Crimes Unit. I
offer the detailed description in order to move beyond
abstractions about the conditions in which police brutality
thrives, and to facilitate an examination of the ways in
which multiple institutions, including the courts, permit
such conduct to continue and its practitioners to prosper.
Section B asks whether the story told about Area Two is
itself anecdotal, or is representative of a larger pattern. To
assist in placing the Area Two story in context, this section
describes more generally the attributes of police brutality
as practiced in the United States.
Part II seeks to understand the pattern of
fragmentation that characterizes the judicial reaction to
police brutality. Section A suggests that the literary notion
29. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
30. See Rob Yale, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1841, 1846-51 (1997) (discussing the "significant injury"
requirement that is sometimes used to supplement the requirement of
objectively unreasonable police conduct).
31. See Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397
(1997); see also David Hamilton, The Importance and Overuse of Policy and
Custom Claims:A View from One Trench, 48 DEPAUL L. REV 723 (1999).
32. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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of anecdote, with its concerns about irrelevant detail, the
linkages among seemingly disparate acts, and the problem
of judging representativeness, can help us think about the
patterns of police brutality and why they are so often
anecdotalized. It suggests that judicial decisions about what
details are connected, relevant, or representative are not
merely mechanical, but rather are informed by cultural,
social, and political assumptions. Section B posits several
such assumptions that may lead judges to view patterns of
police brutality as a series of disconnected events.
I.

POLICE BRUTALITY: THE IRRELEVANT Is THAT WHICH

FAILS To PRESERVE OUR LAWS

What accounts for the terrible resilience of police
brutality? There have been a few success stories, such as
the fact that the use of the third degree is no longer
acceptable or prevalent,3 and the steep decline in police
shootings of non-dangerous fleeing felons.34 These success
stories are, however, informative mostly against the
backdrop of the much larger failure to control an endemic
pattern of police lawlessness and violence, directed largely
at the poor, minorities and in general the least powerful
members of our society.
ie
33. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS 7 (1995).

34. See id.
35. The Bureau of Justice Statistics, in its first survey of police/citizen
interactions pursuant to 1994 crime control legislation, see infra note 214,
reported that in 1996 Hispanics and African Americans constituted about half
of the people subjected to police force, though they represented only one fifth of
the relevant population. The kinds of force reported included being hit, pushed,
choked, threatened by a flashlight, restrained by a dog, and threatened by a
gun. See Robert Suro, Study Says Cops Used Force v. 500,000, Cm. SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1997, at 21; see also David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use
of Force, in

POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE

OF FORCE 180, 183 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) [hereinafter

POLICE VIOLENCE] ("The presumed moral inferiority and the race of suspects

leads the police to see them as less than human, thereby justifying brutality.");
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 390
(1998) (citing Amnesty International report's findings that police brutality
victims in New York City are largely minority, and that nearly all victims in
cases of death in custody were members of racial minorities); Bob Herbert,
What's Going On?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, § 4, at 13 (noting that New York
police treat young black and Hispanic residents as lesser beings, without the
same rights as whites, while the Mayor, Police Commissioner, and other top
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Under what conditions does change occur? The
explanations in the cases of the third degree and deadly
force are complex and various. They include the
dissemination of effective empirical data, and the
cooperation and leadership of police chiefs and other high
ranking officials." Other factors include judicial acceptance
of responsibility and the evolution of societal norms." As a
nation, we recently observed how change may begin
through a galvanizing anecdote." The George Halliday
videotape of Rodney King's beating set off a national wave
of revulsion, which led to an increased consciousness of
police brutality." It also led, eventually, to the Christopher
and Kolts Commissions' reports, some of whose
recommendations have become law."
officials look the other way); Seth Mydans, Seven Minutes in Los Angeles - A
Special Report: Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, § 1, at Al (stating that court documents
indicate that nearly all the victims of maulings by Los Angeles police dogs in
the last seven years were black or Hispanic, though whites committed nearly a
third of the crimes in which dogs are usually deployed).
36. The influence of a police chief on police culture, as in the well known
case of the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) Daryl Gates, is obvious.
But higher officials also send clear messages about what conduct is acceptable.
For example, police brutality flourished in Philadelphia when Frank Rizzo was
mayor, and dropped significantly under his successor, who set a different tone
for the administration. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 138-42. Similarly,
the Giuliani administration in New York is often accused of achieving its drop
in crime through an accompanying increase in aggressive police tactics. See
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 268. The tone Giuliani sets for the
NYPD is being widely blamed for incidents like the killing of Amadou Diallo.
See Patrick Cole, NYC Shooting Renews Outcry on Police Brutality, CI. TRIB.,
Feb. 15, 1999, at 1; see generally Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Comment,
Just Another Gang: When the Cops Are Crooks Who Can You Trust?, 41 HOW.
L.J. 383, 408 (1998) (noting that the Reagan and Bush administrations' war on
drugs sent the message that police brutality was an acceptable cost of the 'war').
37. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 132; 261-62.
38. Widespread outrage has followed the Louima and Diallo incidents in
New York City. See, e.g., Editorial, Citizens and the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1999, at A20 (discussing protests in the aftermath of the Diallo shooting). The
difficulty is in moving from the initial outrage to lasting reform; See Bob
Herbert, After the Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A31; Editorial, When
Cops Are Killers, THE NATION, Mar. 8, 1999, at 6 (discussing problem of the
"symbology of outrage," generating "a thousand headlines and no victory");
Editorial, The DialloLegacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999; § 4, at 18.
39. See Lou CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: How RODNEY KING AND THE
RIOTS CHANGED LOS ANGELES AND THE LAPD (1997).
40. See JAMES G. KOLTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL ON THE LoS
ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (1992) (KOLTS COMMISSION); INDEPENDENT
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When King's beating first became public, Police Chief
Daryl Gates and others dismissed it as an aberration4 ' (or
alternatively, as fully deserved, and not an example of
brutality at all). What they could not do-this time-was to
deny that it had happened at all.' The video itself
suggested that the beating was not an aberration. The
officers who beat King repeatedly with clubs and stunned
him with tasers did so in full view of eleven officers, some of
supervisory rank, and in full view of at least twenty local
residents standing barely sixty feet away.' These officers
conducted themselves as if they expected there would be no
price to pay for their conduct. Their subsequent behaviorincluding their jocular boasting over the police radio about
their conduct--bears out this conclusion. The behavior of
their colleagues at the station, who refused to accept
complaints about their misconduct,45 exemplifies the
solidarity they expected and received. Indeed, in their
criminal trial, Officers Koon, Powell, Wind and Briseno
moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that they were
being discriminatorily prosecuted for acts that were
common in the department.46 Yet it took a public outcry, the
resignation of a powerful police chief, and the appointment
of a commission to even begin to unravel the fiction of the
solitary rotten apple. And there is a long way to go, in Los
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLiCE DEPARTMENT (1991) (CHRISTOPHER

COMISSION); CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 32 (discussing reports).
41. See CANNON, supranote 39, at 23.

42. See id. Cannon's book, however, suggested that even the Halliday
videotape was susceptible to the dangers of fragmentation and
decontextualizing. He notes that the videotape that received so much airplay
did not include an initial three seconds in which King was shown charging
Officer Powell, and a subsequent ten seconds which were initially very blurred,

and later enhanced by the FBI. See id. at 194, 431. He argues that the
additional footage was a double-edged sword, in that it confirmed a head blow

to King by Powell, but also suggests that it was in response to King's charge.

See id. at 431.
43. See Mydans, supra note 35.
44. The officers' boasts about the incident were received with similar
jocularity. For example, Sergeant Koon sent a message saying "You just had a
big-time use of force." The reply from the police communications desk was "Oh
well. I'm sure the lizard didn't deserve it. Ha, ha. I'll let them know, O.K." Seth
Mydans, In Messages, Officers Banter After Beating in Los Angeles Beating,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at Al.
45. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supranote 1, at 3.

46. See Seth Mydans, Officers in Beating Case File 30 PretrialMotions, N.Y.
TImEs, May 6, 1991, at A23.
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Angeles and elsewhere.

The persistence of police brutality is a case study in the

dangers of fragmenting systemic problems. There is no lack

of anecdotes. And each one, no matter how shocking, no
matter how typical, comes accompanied by the official
statement that it was merely an aberration (if indeed, it
happened at all). In each case, officials hasten to assure us
that the conduct was not part of any greater problem that
could or should be addressed on an institutional level.48 A
recent comprehensive report by Human Rights Watch found
widespread patterns of police brutality nationwide and an
equally widespread failure to address them.49 It found that
in general police departments have been unwilling to

acknowledge

shortcomings

and instead

dismiss

any

criticisms as anecdotal." In response, the National
Association of Chiefs of Police called the study "unfair" and
"uninformed," stating: "We're not saying there aren't a few
presents
bad cops.... What we're saying is that the report
"°
impression.
broad-brushed
inappropriately
an
When Abner Louima was sodomized by police with a
plunger, suffering a torn colon and a ruptured bladder,
while being subjected to racial epithets, Police
Commissioner Safir said he did not consider it "an act of
police brutality[,]" but rather "a criminal act committed by

47. See, e.g., 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1994) (quoting
former New Orleans Police Officer Michael Thames: "I don't know what the big
deal is about the Rodney King beating. It was a kiddie-land beating. And the
only thing bad about those cops is, like, they had a video camera. It goes on
every day, especially in New Orleans").
48. See, e.g., the Mollen Commission's finding that the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) maintained that "police corruption was not a serious
problem, and consisted primarily of sporadic, isolated incidents," quoted in Bob
Herbert, The Stone Wall of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A25; infra text
accompanying notes 52-67.
49. See generally SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supranote 9.
50. See id.
51. Ronald Powers, Big-City Police Faulted in Human Rights Study;
ChicagoAmong Cities Cited; Police Chiefs Rebut Report, PEORIA J. STAR, July 8,
1998, at B5. Presciently, in light of this criticism, the Human Rights Watch
reported that often police officials criticize reports on police abuse as
misinformed or biased instead of considering their findings. The Report
recounted that when the police denied Amnesty International the statistics and
case information the organization requested, the police then criticized the
report as incomplete, largely because of the information they themselves
withheld). See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supranote 9, at 46.
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people who are criminals." 2 He also opined: "Although it's a
horrific event, it's a rare event."53 Almost two years later,
Officer Justin Volpe pled guilty in federal district court to
sodomizing Louima,54 and shortly thereafter Officer Charles
Schwarz was convicted of holding him down.55 Mayor
Giuliani hailed the verdict as evidence that the blue wall of
silence is a myth and that police officers found the conduct
"reprehensible and perverse."56 Yet several other officers
face internal investigations and federal obstruction of
justice charges.57 According to court testimony, several
officers watched Volpe brag about the sodomy and brandish
an excrement-soiled stick immediately after the incident,58
turned away as he appeared ready to toss the stick in the
garbage,59 watched Volpe lead Louima from the bathroom to
a holding cell with his pants around his ankles," and in one
case lied about the incident.6 In all cases, these officers
failed to come forward until after Volpe's arrest and after
learning about a police internal affairs investigation which
also put them at risk.2 Volpe himself testified that although

52. Bob Herbert, Living in Denial,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at A31.
53. Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Takes Over the Louima Case; 5th Suspect, a
Sergeant,Is Indicted,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at Al.
54. See Mark Hamblett, Plea in Louima Trial Alters the Landscape;
DepartureCuts Both Ways for Defendants, N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1999, at 1.
55. See Editorial, Verdict Shatters Blue Wall, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 9,
1999, at 34 [hereinafter ShattersBlue Wall].
56. Id. See also Leonard Levitt, The Louima Verdicts, Some Splits, But Blue
Wall Stands, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4.
57. See Jim Dwyer, Louima Jury Still Wonders, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 13,
1999.
58. See Gregory Kane, Sergeant: Louima's Torturer Boasted; Surprise
Witness Says Cop Showed Off Stick, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 20, 1999, at Al
(stating that Officer Kenneth Wernick testified that when he was told the stick
contained human excrement, he laughed).
59. Id.
60. Karen Hunter, Louima Case Leaves Some Big Questions, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 21, 1999, at 29.
61. Michael Schoer initially told investigators he had not seen anything. See
Levitt, supra note 42.
62. See Gregory Kane, Louima Trial Failedto Dent the Blue Wall of Silence,
THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, June 6, 1999, at 3; Levitt, supra note 56 (reporting
that Officer Kenneth Wernick came forward after being told he would be
questioned in a hearing in which his failure to testify truthfully would mean
dismissal, that Officer Mark Schofield came forward after his gun and shield
had been taken from him, that Officer Michael Schoer initially lied to police
before eventually telling the truth to the FBI, and that Officer Eric Turetzky
did not come forward until six days after the incident, only hours before he was
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there had been another officer in the bathroom with him
during the attack on Louima, "it was understood.., that
that police officer would do nothing to stop me or report it to
anyone."

A little less than one year after Louima was brutalized,
an unarmed West African immigrant named Amadou Diallo
was killed by a hail of forty one bullets fired by four
members of the NYPD's controversial street crimes unit."
Mayor Giuliani, in response, denied that the shooting was
any indication of a pattern of excessive force by the
department. 5 Those who dismissed the Louima and Diallo
attacks as aberrational perhaps saw no connection to the
Amnesty International report a year prior to the attack on
Louima finding a pattern of brutality in the NYPD." Or
perhaps they concurred in the police commissioner's
dismissal of that report as "anecdotal.""1 The Amnesty
International report came only two years after the Mollen
Commission's widely reported findings of widespread abuse
and "willful blindness" to that abuse among the NYPD."
Willful blindness is a good term for it. In addition to all
the anecdotal data, there is a convincing body of empirical
evidence documenting the existence of systemic police
brutality in police departments across the nation. 9 There
are also many gaps in the data, and the reasons for those
gaps are themselves an important part of the story of the
resilience of police brutality. An effective, good faith effort
to be questioned).
63. Kane, supra note 62.
64. See Editorial, The Mayors Other Crime Rating, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1999, at A26 (commenting on how the "aggressiveness and independence of the
street crimes unit, with its macho slogan, 'We own the night,' warrant[s] the
Mayor's attention").
65. See Elisabeth Bumiller with Ginger Thompson, Thousands Gather
Again to Protest Police Shooting, N.Y. TImES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A24 (reporting
that Giuliani continued to deny that the Diallo shooting was any indication of a
pattern of excessive force by the department); see generally Bob Herbert, A
Brewing Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A33.
66. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 46.

67. David Marshall, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TMEs, Aug. 27, 1997, at A22.
Mr. Marshall is a lawyer whose research led to the Amnesty International
Report. See id.
68. Krauss, supra note 17; see also Joseph B. Treaster, Mollen Panel Says
Buck Stops with Top Officers, N.Y. TIEs, July 10, 1994, § 1, at 21. The Mollen
Commission report itself covered much of the same ground as the 1972 Knapp
Commission report.
69. See, e.g., sources cited in note 205.
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to understand and change the patterns of police brutality
would make use of both the anecdotal and the empirical
evidence. It would welcome the anecdotal reports as a
window onto the street and into the interrogation room-a
way to learn about police-citizen encounters that usually
elude supervision or review. It would be open to finding the
patterns among the anecdotal reports, and it would
supplement them with broader empirical studies.
Instead, there appears to be a desire to avoid
knowledge, marked by a relentless anecdotalizing, a refusal
to see patterns and connections, and a refusal even to
gather or share the information that might buttress and
explain the anecdotes. ° Often the refusal is accompanied by
a demand that those alleging brutality provide supporting
evidence, though the type of evidence demanded is largely
in the control of the police themselves.7 ' Instead of carefully
collecting and analyzing data, officials offer the familiar,
reassuring story of rotten apples scrupulously picked out of
an otherwise pristine barrel. And they generalize from
unrepresentative particulars: assumptions about police and
citizen behavior based on the world familiar to the largely
white, middle class officials themselves-a world that may
bear little resemblance to the places in which police
brutality flourishes.
The willful blindness afflicts every level and branch of
government. The resilience of police brutality thrives on
compartmentalization, failures to act, and deflection and
denial of responsibility. Police brutality is the product of
many institutional failures. Indeed, as many who have
studied it believe, it could not thrive without the complicity
70. See Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalizationof Police
Brutality in America: Direct and JudicialAccess to the GrandJury as Remedies
for Victims of Police Brutality When the ProsecutorDeclines to Prosecute, 53 MD.
L. REV. 271, 274 n.4 (1994) (noting that the Department of Justice for many
years declined the authority to gather statistics on patterns of misconduct);
infra note 214.
71. See, e.g., SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 46 (explaining that

the NYPD denied Amnesty International requested statistics and case
information and then criticized its resulting report for not presenting a
complete picture); see also Editorial, Laxity on Police Abuses, N.Y. TImES, Sept.

18, 1999, at A26 (taking Police Commissioner Safir to task for criticizing report
on civilian complaint review board as incomplete and outdated and pointing out

that the author of the report, Public Advocate Mark Green, had had to fight for
the information relied upon in the report for two years, and had obtained it only
by court order).
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of the society police serve. And certainly it could not thrive
without the complicity of the court system.
A. The Story of Chicago'sArea Two Violent Crimes Unit
We don't keep separate count for electroshock, because there are
so few-only three or four since the first of the year.72

Consider the story of the Area Two Violent Crimes
Unit, located in an overwhelmingly poor, black area of the
South Side of Chicago. For years, stories trickled out of
Area Two into the surrounding community that within that
building, police officers were torturing people. 73 The
problem was getting anyone outside the community to
believe the stories. Beginning in the early 1970's, numerous
complaints were filed with the applicable administrative
agencies, the mayor, the state's attorney, and the United
States Attorney, and there were allegations raised in
numerous judicial proceedings.74 These complaints and
allegations came from numerous unconnected sources,
described alarmingly similar acts of torture, and named the
same men over and over.75 But the scandal is not only that
no action was taken for so long. It is also that men
continued to be convicted, imprisoned and-in ten casessent to death row (where they remain today), based on
confessions they alleged were elicited by torture.7 ' The
alleged torturers and those who supervised them continued
to be commended and promoted through the ranks, never
eliciting the slightest hint of official disapproval.7
It eventually became known that over a period of at
least thirteen years, starting in the early 1970's, more than
sixty men, all of them black, had been systematically
tortured by members of a group of approximately fifteen

72. Deborah Nelson, Cop Torture and Shock Allegations Date to '70's, CHI.
SUN-TIMMs, Aug. 2, 1992, at 4 (quoting a spokesman for the Office of
Professional Standards).
73. See Conroy, Town Without Pity, supranote 2, at 14; Editorial, Leads the
Cops Don't Want to Follow, CI. TREB. Feb. 13, 1992, at 20 [hereinafter Leads]
74. See supra text accompanying notes 111-39
75. See supratext accompanying notes 111-39.
76. See Margaret O'Brien, Judge Won't Use Cop Torture Testimony, Cm.
TRM., Sept. 24, 1999, § 2, at 4.
77. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 155-56.
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Area Two officers, all of them white.78 The Office of
Professional Standards [OPS]79 did not investigate the
complaints until 1990, and the city suppressed its report
finding systemic torture in Area Two until 1992.80 The unit
commander and ringleader, John Burge, was not fired until
1993.81 No criminal proceedings were ever instituted. 2 Only

two other officers (both of whom have been reinstated) were
disciplined for any of the incidents, and many of them have
been promoted, commended, and allowed to retire with full
benefits.83 No effort has been made to identify or address
systemic problems in Area Two, or higher up the chain of
command. The story is presented as closed, and even given
a happy ending: the ringleader was ferreted out. As far as
we know, there is no more police torture in Chicago.
A close examination of the Area Two story yields
insight into the ways in which interlocking institutions,
including state and federal courts, enable police brutality to
thrive within the contours of existing law and social policy.
The examination will also provide a concrete illustration of
the assumptions that help government officials, including
judges, accept and in many respects condone official
brutality, and the way those assumptions work.'
When suspects were tortured in Area Two, many of
them sought to file complaints.88 Some may have attempted
to complain at Area Two itself. If so, there is no record of
what occurred. The failure of police personnel to log
complaints against their colleagues is a common problem
and one cause of the lack of data on police wrongdoing.'
78. See, e.g., United States ex rel Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1078,
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 153.
79. An internal agency of the police department which is made up of civilian

1094 (N.D. Ill 1999);

departmental employees, and which reports to the Superintendent of Police. See
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 165.
80. See Scott Fornek, Police Review Brutality Cases Spanning 20 Years, Cm.
SUN-TImEs, Feb. 25, 1993, at 10.
81. See Conroy, Shocking Truth, supra note 2, at 30.
82. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supranote 9, at 155-56.
83. See id.
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. See Fornek, supranote 80.
86. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing George Halliday's
attempt to file a complaint in the Rodney King case); see also Yale, supra note
30, at 1854 (recommending the institution of a standardized national system of
receiving and recording complaints against the police); Nightline: The Blue
Wall-Part II (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1997) (containing an account
by Abner Louima's brother and cousin of the refusal of the desk sergeant at the
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But most suspects filed complaints with the OPS.87 In this
venue, the complaints were dismissed as "not sustained," a
fate that befalls the vast majority of the complaints filed
with OPS. 8 "Not sustained" usually means that the only
witnesses to the incident were the police and the victims,
and that OPS cannot figure out whom to believe. One
journalist described "not sustained" as "a shrug that says
'who knows?'"89 A finding of "not sustained" also reflects the
presumption, automatically employed as a matter of OPS
policy, that in an uncorroborated swearing contest, the
officer's word must be believed." When corroboration is
available, it often comes from people whose credibility is
questioned, such as other suspects, friends or family, people
with criminal records, or gang members. 9'
Brutality and its culture create many of these
conditions. Brutality is, by definition, concealed. The
torturer usually attempts to leave no marks.92 Many of
Commander Burge's techniques, including suffocating the
suspect, placing a revolver in the suspect's mouth,
squeezing the suspect's testicles, and playing Russian
roulette, leave no physical trace. When there is visible
injury, unless there is corroboration, it becomes the officer's
word against the suspect's as to how and where it
occurred.93
70th precinct to allow them to file a complaint about Louima's assault by
police).
87. See Yale, supra note 30, at 1854; see also John L. Stainthorp, with the
assistance of Flint Taylor, LitigatingPolice Torture in Chicago, 13 CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 3-2 (Salzman ed., 1998).
88. Eric Zorn, Police BrutalityAlleged: Bring on the Internal Review, CI.
TRIB., Oct. 2, 1997, § 2, at 1. OPS claims that 90-92% of complaints are
classified as "not sustained," and press figures put the percentage even higher.
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 166.
89. Eric Zorn, Police Terminology Clouds Unresolved Brutality Cases, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 6, 1997, § 2, at 1.
90. See Telephone Interview with Flint Taylor, People's Law Office attorney
for several of those alleging police brutality, including Aaron Patterson and the
Wilson brothers (Feb. 13, 1998); see also Leads, supra note 73. As one attorney
put it: "If the officer denies it, you're out of luck." SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra
note 9, at 168.
91. See, e.g., People v. Hobley, 637 N.E.2d 992 (ll. 1994); People v. Holmes,
556 N.E.2d 539 (Ill App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1990).
92. See Conroy, Town Without Pity, supra note 2, at 22.
93. See, e.g., Brief of the State of Illinois in People v. Cannon at 37, 688
N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (No. 94-4409), in which the state's attorney
sarcastically said, inter alia:
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The swearing contest is stacked by two other essential
characteristics of brutality. One characteristic is that it is
concealed not only by the officer inflicting it, but by the
officer's colleagues and supervisors.94 The nationwide code
of silence is well documented, pervasive, and crucial to the
continuation of official brutality.95 In Area Two, no officer
ever publicly stepped forward to corroborate the existence of
torture, or even intervened at the stationhouse itself.96
[S]omehow, defendant did not sustain severe muscle and tissue injuries
and was able to make use of his shoulders and arms after being lifted
by his handcuffs from behind and twice being 5 feet off the ground.
Through divine intervention, defendant did not bite through his tongue
or lip while being repeatedly electrocuted and suffering 'the most
excruciating pain' of his life in various areas of the city. Detective
Dignan who apparently possesses some magical ability to torture
without leaving any evidence also grabbed defendant by his hair when
he saw defendant's siblings in the police parking lot. Again, there was
neither balding nor bruising to defendant's scalp.
(brief on file with author).
94. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,Perjury and the Heater Factor:An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 10814(1992).
95. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 51; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at
119; Stanley Z. Fisher, 'Just the Facts, Ma'am": Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 12 (1983)
(calling police deception part of the culture, not aberrational); infra text
accompanying notes 324-29. Ironically, the decision of several NYPD officers to
step forward in the Louima case, though the decision was made after much
delay and only in the face of impending personal consequences to the officers
themselves, see supra note 62, was hailed by Mayor Giuliani and Police
Commissioner Safir, not only as not aberrational, but as proof that the blue wall
of silence is a myth. See Levitt, supranote 56; supratext accompanying note 56.
96. One individual with intimate knowledge of the torture wrote anonymous
letters to civil rights attorneys providing names of victims. See Conroy,
Shocking Truth, supra note 2, at 26; Conroy, Town Without Pity, supra note 2,
at 23. This officer cited the case of Michael Laverty to explain his refusal to
come forward. Laverty was an Area Two cop who blew the whistle on the
longstanding Area Two practice of keeping a secret set of "street files" separate
from official case files. The street files contained exculpatory evidence the
officers did not wish to turn over to defense attorneys, and other evidence
contradicting the official case. Laverty exposed the practice in order to prevent
the trial of George Jones, a man whom he knew to be innocent, in a capital case
in which his colleagues had suppressed evidence exculpating Jones and
inculpating another man. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 991 (7th
Cir. 1988). Although one panel of the Seventh Circuit thought Laverty should
have been commended for his actions, see id. (citing Palmer v. City of Chicago,
755 F.2d 560, 564 n.3 (1985)), instead he was charged with a disciplinary
infraction, "transferred out of the detective division, ostracized by his fellow
officers, and assigned to a series of menial tasks culminating in the monitoring
of police recruits giving urine samples. None of the defendants has been
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The second characteristic is that brutality is practiced
against members of marginalized groups living in marginal
neighborhoods.97 In Area Two, for example, all of the 65
known torture victims were black. One Philadelphia cop
describing the widely known rules stated: "The first is, keep
it in the ghetto. In the good areas, you don't go stopping
people without cause."98 One byproduct of this rule is that
brutality will seem unbelievable or aberrant to
decisionmakers who tend to hail from more privileged
backgrounds 99 -it will not correspond to their experience.
Another is that those who can corroborate it are too easy to
dismiss-they are more likely to have criminal records, to
be associated with gangs, and to be less articulate,
sophisticated, and educated. They are less likely to evoke
the empathy of decisionmakers with whom they have little
in common."O
Whether a complaint is found sustained or unsustained,
OPS makes no attempt to place it in any larger context.
OPS files are not computerized.'0 ' Due to police union
complaints, in 1992 a five-year statute of limitations on
administrative
proceedings was established,
with
complaints over five years old held inadmissible in internal
investigations. °2 Thus police, attorneys, and the community
were deprived of another avenue for tracking individual or
precinct-wide patterns of brutality. In ruling on a
complaint, OPS does not consider (or even ascertain)
whether there were past complaints against the officer.' 3
No effort is made to discern patterns of complaints
disciplined for misconduct in the arrest and prosecution of George Jones." Id at
991-92. See also Fisher, supra note 95, at 2-4, 36-38, 40-45 (discussing Jones
case), 42 n.207 (discussing treatment of Laverty); Orfield, supra note 94, at 10102 (discussing Jones case).
97. See, e.g,. supra note 35; SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 2, 3946. The report noted that despite gains in many areas since the civil rights
movement, one area that has been stubbornly resistant to change has been the
treatment afforded racial minorities by the police.
98. Michael Kramer, How Cops Go Bad, TIME, Dec. 15, 1997, at 78.
99. See Douglas Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
UnderminingMonell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 561 n.322
(1993).
100. See Conroy, Town Without Pity, supra note 2, at 22; David Jackson,
'Difficult Path to Justice in Police Brutality Cases, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1992, at 1;
see also infra text accompanying notes 312-16.
101. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 169.
102. See id at 167; infra note 209.
103. See Eric Zorn, supra note 88.
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regarding particular officers, particular precincts, or certain
types of conduct (such as discharging a firearm or searching
without a warrant).' This is particularly unfortunate since
in Chicago, as nationwide, a vastly disproportionate
amount of the brutality is committed by a small group of
officers, each of whom may have many complaints in his
file.'0 5 Even multiple sustained complaints have no negative
effect at all on the officer's career-they are not even
entered in his personnel file.'
Even when the rules permit, OPS has not usually been
a zealous investigative agency. Since 1985, three internal
audits have accused the agency of losing investigative files
and failing to interview key witnesses.' 7 Even when a
former Chief of Police asked the agency to look into
allegations against Burge, it took an inordinate amount of

time to do a slipshod and incomplete investigation.'

OPS'

performance is consistent with that of many internal police
104. The police union's contract with the city prevents disclosure of the
names of officers under investigation in most circumstances. See SHIELDED
FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 154 n.9. But see Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D.
226 (N.D. Ill 1997) (striking the confidential designation of OPS files detailing a
pattern of brutality in Area Two on the ground that the public interest in
disclosure of the documents was not outweighed by the privacy interests of the
officers). Often police organizations oppose disclosure of statistics about
brutality even with names and other personal identifying information deleted.
See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 46-49; Lynne Wilson, The Public's
Right to Access to Police Misconduct Files, 4 POLICE MISCONDUCT AND Civ. RTS L.
REP. (1994).
105. In 1989, for example, of Chicago's 11,000 member police force, 437
officers had more than one excessive force complaint. Of these, 278 had two
complaints; 85 had three; 35 had four; and 39 had more than five. See David
Jackson, Police Brutality:How Widespread Is It?, Cmi. TRIB., Mar. 24,, 1991; see
also Flint Taylor, Proof on Police Failure to Discipline Cases: A Survey, in 3
POLICE MISCONDUCT Civ. RTs L. REP. 37, 42-47 (1990) (discussing prevalence of
repeat offenders nationwide); Patton, supra note 23, at 768-77; David
Kocieniewski, More Scrutiny for Shootings by Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998,
at A18 (reporting that police officer who fatally shot an unarmed man on
Christmas Day has been involved in more shootings than any other officer on
the city's police force); Steve Mills & Todd Lighty, Brutality Suit Not 1" Against
Cop, Cm. TRiB., (Metro), Jan. 21, 1999, §1, at 6 (revealing that Chicago Police
Officer Rex Hayes, who is currently being civilly sued for attacking and filing
false charges against a South Chicago man and his daughter, had settled or lost
at least eight other similar suits, in which the city had paid out a total of well
over one million dollars in damages).
106. See Rebecca Anderson, Policing Their Own, CI. REP., Sept. 1999, at 1,
supra note 103, at 8; Zorn, supranote 87.
107. See Jackson, supranote 100.
108. See Conroy, House of Screams, supra note 2, at 26.

1294

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

divisions, stemming largely from the unwillingness of police
officials to identify corruption in their ranks.0 9 As Paul
Chevigny observed in the similar context of New York's
internal affairs division, "its policy was to make all the
corruption investigations look like low-level, individual
matters, so that they would not balloon into generalized
scandals."" For all these reasons, neither the large
numbers of complaints against a small group of officers at
Area Two, nor the fact that they alleged the same highly
unusual and appalling story, was noticed until much later
by the internal agency charged with policing the police.
In the meantime, many of the torture victims confessed,
and were charged with crimes. Thus individual complaints
of torture at Area Two were making their way to the Illinois
courts in suppression motions during the 1980's and early
1990's. For example, in 1982, Andrew Wilson said that he
was repeatedly punched, kicked, smothered with a
typewriter cover, electrically shocked, and forced against a
hot radiator."' In October 1983, Gregory Banks said he
confessed to murder after Burge, John Byrne and other
Area Two detectives beat him, suffocated him, and
subjected him to Russian roulette."' In November 1983,
Darryl Cannon said Byrne, Peter Dignan, and others
subjected him to electroshock with a cattle prod and played
Russian roulette with him, placing the gun in his mouth."'
In 1985, Lonza Holmes said that Burge and Detective
Madigan severely beat him."' In 1986, Aaron Patterson said
that Area Two officers placed a typewriter cover over his
face, beat him, choked him, and threatened him."'
In each case, the trial court denied a motion to suppress
the confession." In many of the cases, the court denied the
defendant access to police department brutality records on
the officers involved."' If the defendant had such evidence

109. See, e.g., CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 80.
110. Id. at 81-82.
111. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 707 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
112. See People v. Banks, 549 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
113. See People v. Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693 (IMI. App. Ct. 1997).
114. See People v. Holmes, 556 N.E.2d 539 (IlM. App. Ct. 1989), appeal
denied, 564 N.E.2d 843 (IlM. 1990).
115. See People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. 1992).
116. See infra appellate court decisions cited in notes 123-135.
117. See, e.g., People v. Hobley, 637 NE 2d 992 (Ill. 1994); Conroy, Town
Without Pity, supranote 2, at 22.
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in his possession, and sought to introduce evidence of

similar acts of brutality by Area Two officers, or even by the
same Area Two officers, the trial court barred such

evidence-granting the state's motion in limine on grounds
that
the evidence
of prior beatings was irrelevant and
8 In
immaterial."
all but the Banks and Wilson cases, the
Illinois appellate courts initially affirmed the trial courts'

rulings. The courts ruled that there were no visible
bruises," 9 or that the bruises could have been inflicted
earlier or by the defendant himself.' Contemporaneous
written statements by one defendant chronicling his abuse

were barred, and dismissed as self serving;'

the testimony

by another defendant's brother regarding bruises was found

insufficiently credible.2

The trial courts' decisions to

suppress evidence of prior acts of brutality were upheld.
The courts ruled, in case after case, that they would defer to

the trial courts' factual conclusions."
Patterson's

motion

to

introduce

prior

OPS

files

regarding brutality by Area Two detectives met the fate
that has been, until quite recently, typical of such motions"

OPS had found the prior allegations "not sustained" which

the Illinois courts

transformed to "unfounded."25 The

Illinois Supreme Court declined to second guess the trial
court's decision to exclude the OPS evidence, stating: "A
mere unfounded accusation that these officers beat someone
118. See, e.g., Patterson,610 N.E.2d at 37.
119. See, e.g., Patterson,610 N.E.2d 16; Holmes, 556 N.E.2d at 539.
120. See e.g. Hobley, 637 N.E.2d at 1002; People v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044
(IlM. 1992).
121. See Patterson,610 N.E.2d at 16.
122. See Holmes, 556 N.E.2d at 539.
123. See id; Hobley, 637 N.E.2d at 992.
124. See, e.g., People v. Maxwell, 670 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. 1996), modified,
People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (M. 1998) (denying defendant post
conviction relief despite studies establishing physical abuse and coercion at
Area Two, because he failed to make a substantial showing that his
constitutional rights were violated); People v. Orange, 659 N.E.2d. 935 (Ill.
1995) (rejecting claim of systematic torture at Area Two from 1982 to 1984
because defendant offered generalized allegations of coercive activity in Area
Two, without other evidence); People v. Murray, 626 N.E.2d 1140 (ill App. Ct.
1993) (holding that allegations of abuse of other suspects at Area Two were
properly excluded as general in nature). But see United States ex rel. Maxwell v.
Gilmore, 37 F. Supp. 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (granting writ of habeas corpus
ordering an evidentiary hearing to consider claims of coercion in light of
testimony of others who alleged torture by same Area Two detectives).
125. Patterson,610 N.E.2d at 36.
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who was arrested at Area Two one year previously, without
more, does not tend to make 2it6 more probable that they
coerced defendant's confession."
Given that holding, the Supreme Court had little
trouble, only one year after rejecting Patterson's claim, in
rebuffing Hobley's attempt to introduce testimony of several
others who claimed to have been abused by Area Two
detectives in similar fashion.'27 The court found that the
three years between Hobley's interrogation and the alleged
incidents made the prior allegations too remote to be
relevant."
The court did not heed the words of Justice Rizzi of the
Illinois Appellate Court, a member of the panel that
reversed Gregory Banks' conviction. Banks had alleged that
Dignan, Byrne, and Charles Grunhard had put a .45 caliber
gun in his mouth and threatened to blow his head off,
struck him with a flashlight on his chest, stomach, and the
back of his legs while he was handcuffed, put a plastic bag
over his head twice while kicking him in the stomach and
the side, and said "we have something for niggers."'29 The
trial court barred reference at trial to complaints of coercion
by Byrne and Dignan thirteen months earlier, holding them
irrelevant. " ' Justice Rizzi wrote in Banks:
When trial judges do not courageously and forthrightly exercise
their responsibility to suppress confessions obtained by such
means, they pervert our criminal justice system as much as the

few misguided law enforcement officers who obtain confessions in
utter disregard of the rights guaranteed to every citizen-

including criminal suspects-by our constitution.

Despite Justice Rizzi's warning, the Hobley court
distinguished the thirteen month gap in Banks from the
thirty six month gap between Hobley's beating and those he
alleged. It found the latter gap long enough to render the

126. Id at 38. See Editorial, Fatal Consequences, Ci. SuN-TiMES, Dec. 15,
1998, at 45 (reporting on petition filed by the MacArthur Justice Center and 65
death penalty opponents seeking to halt Patterson's execution, and calling for
courts to review petition carefully). I am one of those who signed the petition.
127. See Hobley, 637 N.E.2d at 992.
128. See id. at 1010.
129. People v. Banks, 549 N.E.2d 766, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
130. See id. at 770.
131. Id. at 771.
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past conduct irrelevant. 132 The fact that Hobley, Banks,
Patterson, and numerous other unconnected individuals
were alleging the same unspeakable course of conduct,
by
13
the same officers, over and over, escaped its notice.
The Illinois Supreme Court's peculiar notions of
relevance may explain why the state's attorney was
comfortable arguing, in the Cannon case, that the
testimony of twenty-eight other arrestees who claimed to
have been tortured at Area Two was irrelevant to Cannon's
claim of torture.' The testimony of the prior arrestees
included claims that Dignan, Byrne, Grunhard, and others
had suffocated them with plastic bags, shocked them in the
testicles, beaten them with a flashlight, held a gun in their
mouths, and hanged them from handcuffs, among other
allegations. 5 The State argued that the prior evidence was
irrelevant because it differed from that at Cannon's trial.
For example, whereas Cannon alleged that officers placed a
shotgun in his mouth and pulled the trigger, these
arrestees alleged that officers placed a handgun in their
mouths. 36 And whereas Cannon alleged the use of a
cattleprod, other arrestees alleged that they were beaten
with a flashlight.'37 The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the
argument, finding that the prior evidence was relevant to
the intent, motive, and course of conduct of the officers, and
also could be used to impeach their credibility. 8 It
remanded the case to the trial court, directing the judge to
permit evidence of the prior brutal acts.3 9
132. See Hobley, 637 N.E.2d at 1009-110.
133. See id. at 1010; see also People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 335 (Ill.
1998) (reaffirming the ruling denying Hobley postconviction relief, despite
Hobley's contention that the OPS report detailing a prior pattern of brutality
constituted newly discovered evidence). The Illinois Appellate Court relied on
Hobley in People v. Hinton, 706 N.E.2d 1017 (Mll. App. Ct. 1998), appeal denied,
712 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. 1999) (finding the evidence of a pattern of brutality
irrelevant to claims that John Burge had tortured Hinton, since the only
evidence that Hinton himself was tortured was his own testimony and a bloody
jersey that he could not show had been bloodied in custody).
134. See People v. Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693, 695 (IM. App. Ct. 1997).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 697.
137. See id. at 696-98.
138. See id. at 697.
139. At the time of this writing, the evidentiary hearing is underway. See
Steve Mills, Torture AllegationsLead to Case Review from Man Convicted in '84
Based on Confessions, Cm. TRM., July 23, 1999, at N1. Aaron Patterson and
others who allege torture by John Burge are scheduled to testify. Lawyers for
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How did Darryl Cannon learn of twenty-eight prior
incidents? Alhough he was first interrogated in 1983, and
tried in 1984, his conviction was reversed on grounds
unrelated to the conduct of his interrogation. By the time
he was retried in 1994, information was available that had
been nonexistent or inaccessible ten years earlier. It began
with the 1982 interrogation of Andrew Wilson and his
brother Jackie, who had been arrested for killing two police
officers.' The investigation following the police killing
included a house by house canvass of the area of the
shooting, in which police kicked down doors, and, according
to the Rev. Willie Barrow of Operation PUSH, stopped and
questioned every young black male in sight. The Rev. Jesse
Jackson compared the situation to "martial law " the
holding hostage of the entire black community."' 12 The
Wilson brothers were both convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison for the killings. In 1982,
Andrew Wilson filed a complaint with OPS about his
interrogation, which was found not sustained.' 4
In 1986 Wilson, represented by a small, highly
committed group of veteran police misconduct litigators,
filed a federal civil rights suit against the individual officers
and the City of Chicago.'45 Wilson's testimony is described
in excruciating detail in three articles by John Conroy,
House of Screams, Town Without Pity, and The Shocking
Truth."4'Forexample, from Wilson's testimony:
Detective Yucaitis entered the room... carrying a brown paper
bag from which he extracted a black box. Yucaitis allegedly pulled

two wires out of the box, attached them with clamps to Wilson's
Cannon, Patterson, and others have requested a joint hearing before the Illinois
Supreme Court to establish the pattern and practice of torture by Burge and
other Area Two detectives. Perhaps in response, State's Attorney Richard
Devine has asked the Illinois Supreme Court to halt proceedings in the
Patterson case as well as two other torture cases (those of Derrick King and
Ronald Kitchen) until the Cannon case is resolved. See Steve Mills, Devine Asks
Delay in Cases of 3 Who Claim Cop Torture, Cm. TRIB., July 29, 1999, at N1
[hereinafter Mills, Devine]
140. See Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693.
141. See People v. Wilson, 626 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (1st Dist. 1993).
142. Conroy, House of Screams, supranote 2, at 8.
143. See id.
144. Stainthorp, supranote 87, at 3-4.
145. The ultimate decision in the case is in Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F. 3d
1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
146. See supranote 2.
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right ear and nostril, and then turned a crank on the side of the

box.
'I kept hollering when he kept cranking,' Wilson said, 'but he
stopped because somebody come up to the door.'... Burge
returned with the black box about an hour later. He said 'fun
time.'... Burge put one clip on each of his suspect's ears and
started cranking.... I was hollering and screaming. I was calling
for help and stuff. My teeth was grinding, flickering in my head,
pain and all that stuff.... That radiator... it wouldn't have
mattered. That box.., took over. That's what was happening. The
heat radiator didn't even exist then. The box existed.'

Photos taken the next day at the request of Wilson's
lawyer showed burn marks where Wilson claimed to have
been held against a radiator, and a pattern of scabs on his
ears that "seemed inexplicable unless one believed that
alligator clips had indeed been attached to Wilson's ears."48
But on cross examination of Wilson, the policemens'
attorney suggested that Wilson had found a roach clip
between the time he left Area Two and the time he went to
Cook County Jail, and that he had placed it on his ears and
nose in order to support his story that he had been
subjected to electrical shock.'
The first trial ended in a hung jury.5 ' Toward the end of
the first trial, Wilson's lawyers fortuitously began learning
of other victims of torture at Area Two.' 5' The information
came, at the beginning, from the anonymous letter
mentioning Melvin Jones, who led the lawyers to other
victims.'52 At Wilson's second trial, District Judge Brian
147. Conroy, House of Screams, supranote 2, at 20.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See G. Flint Taylor, Two Significant Decisions in Chicago Torture
Cases, 5 PoLicE MISCONDUCT & CIV. RTs L. REP., July-Aug. 1997, at 1.
151. In a deposition of Jon Burge, Wilson's lawyers repeatedly asked him for
information on prior allegations of misconduct against him. Burge said he could
not recall any, except one by someone named Michael Johnson. In denying a
request for sanctions against Burge for failing to cooperate with discovery,
Judge Duff found that "while Burge may have had a beneficially faulty memory,
the court cannot say he lied." Wilson v. City of Chicago, No. 86-C-2360, 1989
WL 65189, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd. 6 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1993).
152. The Jones letter arrived near the end of the first civil trial. When
Wilson's lawyers moved for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence,
Judge Duff denied their motion, finding that, among other shortcomings, they
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Duff excluded the testimony of Jones, who claimed to have
been subjected to electroshock by Burge and other officers
nine days before the interrogation of Wilson, in an
investigation of the same crime. 5 ' He also excluded the
testimony of Donald White that he was arrested in the
same investigation shortly before Wilson was, and was
beaten for several hours by Burge and other Area Two
officers.'54 Judge Duff held Jones' and White's testimony
irrelevant. In Jones' case, he found his account diverged
significantly from Wilson's: Jones claimed he was shocked
using tweezers rather than alligator clips. Judge Duff was
particularly skeptical of White, finding that his failure to
complain to the State's Attorney or to file a complaint with
OPS damaged his credibility.'55
The jury thus heard no evidence of Burge's prior
conduct. The resulting highly confusing jury verdict was
that Wilson's constitutional rights had been violated, that
the City of Chicago had a de facto policy authorizing its
police officers to physically abuse persons suspected of
having killed or injured a police officer, but that this policy
had not been a direct or proximate cause of the abuse to
Wilson." '
In 1987, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned Wilson's
criminal conviction, finding that he had visible injuries,
such as burns on his chest and thigh, a black eye, cuts
requiring stitches, and bleeding on the eye surface.157 It
found he had been injured while in police custody, and
remanded for a new trial because the state had not met its
burden of explaining the injuries.'58
At the same time, public awareness of Wilson's
allegations about Burge was beginning to grow. In 1989one year after Burge was promoted from lieutenant to
commander-a local watchdog group called Citizens Alert
had not exercised due diligence in their attempts to discover it. See id. at "4.
153. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing
district court rulings); see also Conroy, House of Screams, supra note 2, at 30
(quoting Judge Duffs rulings as transcribed in the trial transcripts. The rulings
were orally rendered on May 19, 1987, four weeks before the start of the second
trial).
154. See Conroy, House of Screams, supra note 2, at 30.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See People v. Wilson, 506 N.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Ill. 1987).
158. He was again convicted on retrial. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d
1233, 1236 (7th Cir 1993) (giving background of state criminal case).
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asked OPS to reopen Wilson's 1982 investigation as well as
some other files in which Burge was mentioned. 159 Citizens
Alert formed a special Task Force to Confront Police
Violence, which created a coalition of more than fifty
community organizations to lobby the police board. 60 The
coalition began an intensive campaign of letter writing,
speeches, articles, marches and rallies. They spoke at every
police board meeting until the board agreed to have OPS
reopen the case. 6 ' Protests escalated as other men began
stepping forward with similar allegations of torture. 6 In
1990, Amnesty International issued a report finding that
systematic torture had occurred in Area Two."' That same
year, OPS began its new investigation."
OPS filed two reports in 1990.165 The first found that
John Burge had applied electroshock to Wilson and had
burned his face, chest, and thigh by holding them against a
radiator. 66 The second found that Burge and others had
engaged in systematic abuse, including planned torture, for
at least thirteen years, claiming at least fifty victims. 7 It
concluded that command members were aware of the
systematic abuse and had perpetuated it, either by
participating or by failing to take any action. 68 The city
immediately had the reports sealed, and they were not
released until 1992, by the order of a federal judge in a
related case.69 Upon the report's release, Police
Superintendent Leroy Martin called it "statistically
flawed."' Martin reportedly claimed that "to believe the
department has a brutality problem is to smear the
M

159. See Stainthorp, supra note 87, at 3-22.
160. See Conroy, Town Without Pity, supranote 2, at 25.
161. Telephone Interview with Mary Powers, Executive Director of Citizens
Alert, Feb. 9, 1998.
162. See Ken Parish Perkins, The Bane of Brutality: Commander's Firinga
StartingPoint for Look at How Cops Treat Minorities, Cin. TRIB., (Tempo), July
4, 1994, at 3.
163. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 153 (discussing Amnesty
International's Allegations of Police Torture).
164. See Stainthorp, supra note 87, at 3-22.
165. See Conroy, Town Without Pity, supranote 2, at 14.
166. See id. at 14 (discussing report of Francine Sanders).
167. See id. (discussing report of Michael Goldston).
168. See id.
169. See Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
170. Charles Nicodemus, Brutality Rap Hits Merit Cop, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1995, at 3.
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sacrifices of officers who have died in the line of duty."171
Mayor Daley said, 'These are only allegations...
allegations, rumors, stories, things like that. This is a
report by an individual. It is not fully documented." 172
Although neither Daley nor Martin took action at the
time, public pressure continued. Burge was eventually fired
by the Police Board in 1993.17' Two other men were

disciplined for fifteen months each and then reinstated. 174
The president of the Police Board emphasized that the
Board's findings were based on the Wilson case alone,
stating "[wle did not make findings on any other cases. This
is not an indictment of the entire police department."' 5
Burge's firing was upheld in state circuit court.17 The
judge commented: "[R]egrettably, I have to affirm the ruling
of the police board." 77 No criminal charges were brought
against Burge" or any of the other Area Two officers.'79 No
federal investigation was undertaken. 8 ' The other Area
Two officers, like Peter Dignan, continue to be decorated
and promoted.' 8' In 1995, Dignan was promoted to the rank
of lieutenant
for
meritorious
service.'82
Police
171. Leads, supranote 73.
172. Id.
173. See Sharman Stein, Police Board Fires Burge for Brutality, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 11, 1993, § 1, at 18.
174. The Fraternal Order of Police was unsuccessful in its effort to enter a
float in the 1993 Saint Patrick's Day Parade honoring Burge and the other
disciplined officers. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir.
1993).
175. Stein, supra note 173.
176. Andrew Fegelman, Cop Firingin Torture Case Upheld, Cm. TRIB., Feb.
11, 1994 at 6.
177. Id.
178. Burge is currently living in Florida, where he works as a security guard
and sails his forty foot cabin cruiser, Vigilante. See Charles Nicodemus, Cop
Links 10 CapitalCases, Cm. SUN TI mEs, Feb. 26, 1999, at 6.
179. It is extremely rare for the Cook County State's Attorney's Office to
prosecute a police brutality case. The Chicago Tribune reports that between
1982 and 1992 only six officers have been criminally charged with abuse. Of
those, five were acquitted. The sixth-who shot an unarmed man in the back of
the head during a 1983 traffic stop-was convicted only of a misdemeanor civil
rights violation. See Jackson, supra note 100.
180. See Paul Hoffman, Feds, Lies and Videotape, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455
(1993) for a discussion of the Justice Department's traditional hands-off
attitude toward state level police brutality.
181. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supranote 9, at 155.
182. He was named one of the nation's "top cops," leading to a visit to the
White House in which he shook President Clinton's hand. Conroy, Poison, supra
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Superintendent Matt Rodriguez was quoted as saying he
was unaware of the allegations against Dignan when the
selection was made. 18 3 The Mayor's spokesman said "the
Police Department obviously had all sorts of information at
its fingertips when it made these promotions, and is
standing behind the promotion, and so are we." "
As it turned out, the police department did have
substantial information at its fingertips. In 1999,
information ordered released over the strenuous objections
of city attorneys shows for the first time that OPS had, in
the early 1990's, reopened nine of the torture cases,
reversing earlier rulings and determining that Burge and
other Area Two detectives had indeed tortured six of the
complainants.'85 Furthermore, the released documents show
that after determining systematic abuse had occurred, OPS
failed to act on the information and simply allowed the files
to languish.'86 These critically important findings were kept
secret from the alleged brutality victims, some of whom are
on death row and in the midst of the appellate process."'
Late last year, the police department's general counsel,
Thomas Needham, decided that the files should be closed
because they were too old.'88 He stated that "the lengthy
delay between the date of the initial complaint and the
present makes it virtually impossible to conduct any kind of
meaningful inquiry into the matters in issue.""' He advised
that the sustained findings be changed to "not sustained,"
clearing the officers. 9 '
note 2, at 26.
183. See Nicodemus, supranote 170.
184. Id.
185. Federal District Court Judge David Coar ordered the information
released, on discovery in an unrelated case alleging a municipal policy of police
brutality. See Santiago v. Marquez, No. 97C-2775, 1998 WL 160878, at *1 (N. D.
Ill. 1998); see also Steve Mills, Prober Found Cop Torture Was Likely, CmH.
TRm., Apr. 21, 1999, § 2, at 1.
186. See Mills, supra note 185.
187. These include the cases of Darrell Cannon, Aaron Patterson and
Ronald Jones. See Mills, Devine, supranote 139.
188. See Steve Mills, Brutality Probe Haunts City; Cops Go Unpunished
Despite OPS FindingsSuspects Were Tortured, CH. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1999, § 1, at

7.
189. Id.
190. Id. See Conroy, Poison, supra note 2, at 31. Federal Judge David Coar
has since ordered Chicago Police Superintendent Terry Hillard to answer
questions about the dismissed allegations. See Steve Mills, Judge Keeps Heat on
Alleged Cop Torture, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1999, § 2, at 5. Community groups and
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As to the Wilson brothers', in 1993, the Seventh Circuit ruled in
their civil rights suit. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the court
found that the federal district court's rulings on relevance had
deprived the Wilsons of a fair trial.' 91 The Seventh Circuit held
that the District Court had erred in allowing in "a massive amount
of highly inflammatory evidence" meant to recreate the Wilsons'
actions in killing two police officers, which had little or no
relevance to the issues at trial.192 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit
found that the District Court had wrongly excluded the testimony
of Melvin Jones and Donald White. Judge Posner wrote:
[The District Court] kept out on grounds of relevance the plainly
relevant testimony of Melvin Jones... If Burge had used an
electroshock device on another suspect only a few days previously,
this made it more likely (the operational meaning of 'relevant')
that he had used it on Wilson. Another excluded plaintiffs
witness, Donald White, would have testified that he was arrested
as a suspect in the murder of the two police officers shortly before
Wilson's arrest and was taken to a police station where he was
beaten for several hours by Burge and other defendant officers.
Although evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to prove a
propensity to commit such acts, it is admissible for other
purposes,
93
including intent, opportunity, preparation, and plan.

The court remanded for a third trial on the individual

allegations.!9'

The court also considered the municipal liability
holding. It found that Police Superintendent Brzeczek, who
was the relevant policymaking official, had received many
complaints about abuse in Area Two, that he had referred
them to OPS which had done nothing "except lose a lot of
the complaints,"'95 that he had written to the State's
attorney, but when he received no answer, did nothing, that
he had signed a commendation for Burge, and that a
attorneys for the brutality victims are urging that the cases be reopened. See
Ashley Bach, Police Urged to Reopen Alleged Torture Cases, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 3,

1999 § 2, at 3.
191. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
192. Id. at 1237. The court found that the underlying facts of the crimes
were not relevant to Wilson's credibility, and therefore exceeded the scope of
cross examination. See id.
193. Id. at 1238 (citing FED. R. EviD. 404(b)).
194. The case settled for more than one million dollars before going to trial
for a third time. See Conroy, Shocking Truth, supranote 2, at 1.
195. Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1240.
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rational jury could have inferred that he knew Area Two
officers were prone to beat up suspected cop killers. 9 ' But,
said the court, "failing to eliminate a practice cannot be
equated to approving it... Proof of dereliction of duty was
not enough. But that was all there was."'97
B. The Patternof No Pattern
The system operates to immunize police from internal discipline
and gives the appearance of formal justice, but actually helps to
institutionalize subterfuge and injustice.' 9'

Perhaps our first instinct is to dismiss the story of Area
Two as largely the work of one evil man, an isolated
throwback to more primitive times, with no larger
significance. A common reaction to unthinkable stories of
this nature is to anecdotalize and compartmentalize themto assume that they could not happen in our community,
that they could only happen to others and never to us or
those we value, and that they are not representative. It is
also common to rationalize such incidents-to assume that
the victims must have brought their punishment on
themselves.' 99 This, too, is a way of reassuring ourselves
that we are exempt from such a fate.00
This reaction has elements of truth to it. First of all, police
brutality is unlikely to be inflicted on non-minority
members of the middle class.201 One of the salient
characteristics of police brutality is that it is largely
practiced on poor and minority groups-in part as a way of
devaluing them and demarcating them from us."' This
196. See id.
197. Id. at 1240.
198. David Fogel, former director of the Chicago OPS, in a 1987 internal
memorandum to the mayor of Chicago, quoted in Zorn, supranote 88.
199. See, for example, the testimony apparently accepted by the jurors in
the first trial of the officers accused of beating Rodney King-that he brought
the beatings on by his resistance, CANNON, supranote 39, at 253-58.
200. See ERWIN STAUB, THE ROOTS OF EvIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND

OTHER GROUP VIOLENCE 79 (1989) (describing just world thinking).
201. Chevigny says it is rare and risky to subordinate those who are not
subordinate, who are middle or upper class. CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 12; see
also supra note 35.
202. See STAUB, supra note 200, at 58; Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry,
Disrespect as Catalyst for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at Al
(describing racial component of incidents of brutality by the NYPD).
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characteristic helps allow brutality to flourish, by making it
easier for us to discount and marginalize the victims'
credibility, value, even humanity. Second, a longstanding
torture ring may be unusual even in the annals of brutality,
at least in the United States. Paul Chevigny, in referring to
the minimization of the third degree as one of the human
rights success stories in the United States, refers to Area
Two as one of the "pockets where the third degree has
recently been used""3 and linking the types of torture that
occurred there to tactics used in Brazil.
Nevertheless, in most significant respects, what happened
at Area Two is highly representative of business as usual
both in Chicago and throughout the United States. As the
foregoing account makes clear, the torture of more than
sixty black men in Area Two over a period of more than
thirteen years could not have occurred without the
assistance of numerous individuals and institutions,
including judicial officers and judicial institutions. And as
the work of Chevigny, Jerome Skolnick, James Fyfe, and
other scholars of police brutality well illustrates, if the
methods of brutality were unusual, the rest of the story was
all too familiar.
In Los Angeles, New York, Pittsburgh, New Orleans,
Washington, D.C., Philadelphia-in every city for which
anecdotal or statistical evidence exists, the pattern of no
pattern, the relentless anecdotalizing, the refusal to learn,
to know, to acknowledge, is the predominant reaction to
police brutality.25 There are some city-based differences in
police

culture, 206

but

much

more

striking

are

the

similarities-the siege mentality, the us/them attitude, the
tendency to abuse poor minorities, the blue wall of silence,
and the elevation of loyalty over integrity.2 7 The
administrative structures set up to deal with brutality vary
203. CHEVIGNY, supranote 33, at 133.
204. See id.
205. See, e.g., SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9 (discussing fourteen
cities); CHEVIGNY, supra note 33 (discussing New York and Los Angeles.) See

also the excellent five part series about police brutality in Washington D.C.
entitled Bias and the Badge, appearing in the WASH. POST, Nov. 15-19, 1998, at
Al.
206. See, e.g., CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, chapters 1 and 2; Robert E. Worden,
The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force, in
POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 35, at 23, 30-32.
207. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 25-122.
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in some of their particulars-for example internal versus
external-but few of the applicable administrative agencies
are willing to see or act on patterns of brutality."8 Often,
the agencies are bound by, or themselves promulgate, rules
designed to impose secrecy, and to prevent knowledge of
patterns and linkages."' State courts vary in their
independence and, even in a state like Illinois in which all
state judges are elected, one or two courageous judges can
make a real difference.1' And indeed, the story of Area Two
includes examples of judges, both state and federal, who
challenged the conventional assumptions and attempted to
use the courts to reform rather than condone police
brutality. 1' But most striking are the acquiescence, the
passivity, the overwhelming credulousness of the state
courts when faced with brutality claims and rote official

denials." The federal government has largely been part of
the problem-deferring to state law enforcement agencies,

and rarely prosecuting either criminally or civilly.213 The

Justice

Department,

far

from

looking

for

patterns,

historically opposed legislation that would have required
local governments to report data to them, and then claimed
that the problem was local since the federal government
208. See id. (discussing weak civilian review, ineffectual civil remedies,
passivity on criminal prosecution, both state and federal, problematic internal
affairs units, and other agency failures).
209. For example, the City of Chicago's agreement with the police union
that all OPS complaints older than 5 years cannot be used in an internal
investigation, discussed in Anderson, supra note 106, at 102. Another provision
of the same contract prevents the disclosure of the names of officers under
investigation unless there has been a criminal conviction or a decision has been
rendered by the Police Board. SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 154 n.9.
For a discussion of the Justice Department's unwillingness, until recently, to
request or support legislation enabling it to track patterns of brutality, see infra
note 214; Hoffman, supranote 180, at 1490.
210. See, for example, Judge Rizzi's courageous opinion in the Banks case,
exhorting other judges to show similar skepticism toward rote denials of
torture, People v. Banks, 549 N.E.2d 766, 771 (l. App. Ct. 1989).
211. Thus in the story of police brutality told in this article, the actions of
these judges are viewed as aberrational rather than part of a larger pattern. I
believe this is the correct view, but want to draw attention to the fact that this
story, like any other, seeks coherence, and chooses, according to the author's
notions of significance, which events and actions are representative and which
are anecdotal.
212. See discussion of the Illinois courts faced with Area Two brutality
claims, supratext accompanying notes 111-44.
213. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supranote 9, at 106; Hoffman, supra note
180, at 1455.
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had no useful knowledge about it. 14 The federal courts have
their own ways of disaggregating patterns of brutality,
including an aversion to municipal liability suits.215 Besides,
the federal courts are only as effective as is the law that
binds them. Much of the problem stems from Supreme
Court decisions like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,"6 Rizzo v.
Goode,
Bryan County v. Brown,218 Briscoe v. Lahue., 9
DeShaney v. Winnebago County,2
and United States

214. See Hoffman, supra note 130, at 1490. The Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994) now authorizes the Justice
Department to investigate and litigate pattern and practice allegations against
local police departments. See Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go Bad, 82
A.B.A.J. 62 (1996) (discussing the scope of the pattern and practice legislation).
However, as of 1998 the Justice Department had yet to produce an annual
report. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 108). Nevertheless, some
progress is being made. For example, pursuant to a consent decree, the City of
Pittsburgh will establish a computer database that tracks every officer,
including detailed descriptions of all filed citizen civil or administrative claims,
all documented uses of force, and the race of everyone arrested, searched
without a warrant, or stopped for a traffic violation. An early warning program
has been instituted to monitor this data to identify and address unusual
patterns of behavior. The information will be kept for as long as each officer is
on the force and for three years thereafter, and made available to the Office of
Municipal Investigations before officials question an officer about a brutality
allegation. See United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr.
16, 1997).
215. See Colbert, supranote 99; see also Hamilton, supranote 31.
216. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Lyons denies standing for injunctive relief to
litigants unable to demonstrate the likelihood that they will again be subject to
the same conduct. See id. Since the courts are reluctant to assume that police
misconduct will continue, and equally reluctant to recognize that the
misconduct often targets particular (poor, minority) neighborhoods, they rarely
find the threshold of likelihood of recurrence to be met.
217. 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (upholding dismissal of suit alleging patterns of
police misconduct and brutality, based on lack of standing, federalism, and an
unwillingness to hold government responsible for its failure to supervise). See
also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), vacated, 414 U.S. 514 (1974)
(denying standing to challenge a pattern of racial discrimination in
administration of the city's criminal justice system).
218. 520 U.S. 1283 (1997), reh'gdenied, 520 U.S. 1283 (1997) (holding that a
Section 1983 municipal liability action for failure to train or supervise will not
lie absent evidence that the policymaker knew, in making his decision, that it
would deprive the particular victim of his civil rights).
219. 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (holding that police officers have absolute
immunity for their testimony at trial, even if it is peijured).
220. 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that due process does not include any
affirmative governmental duties to protect, even for governmental agencies like
police or fire departments that are mandated and expected to afford protection
to the citizenry).
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v.Whren,22' which represent the Court's own refusal to
acknowledge or act on patterns of police abuse.
The "whole story," the coherent tale that courts tell
about police brutality, is a story of dedicated police officers
whose sole motivation is to serve the public good. The
evidence of brutality is dismissed as anecdotal and
irrelevant. The coherent tale remains coherent by rejecting
or assimilating alternative stories. It either rejects stories
of brutality as irrelevant and incredible or treats them as
exceptions that prove the rule-isolated instances of
"9savage torture" that constitute "an exceedingly marked
and unusual deviation"222 from a squeaky clean norm.
Why do courts continue to adhere to the narrative of the
rotten apples in the face of so many challenges to its
coherence? Or, put differently, why do judges so often see
their role as to perpetuate the status quo rather than to
provide a check on lawless state behavior? What notions of
relevance do courts use when they so often relegate each act
of brutality to the realm of the irrelevant detail? When
courts determine whether a suspect's injury was caused by
a police officer, or whether several such police-inflicted acts
were caused by the department's policies, what notions of
causation do they employ, and what assumptions underlie
these notions? When they need to fill in the blanks to
render a story coherent, what pre-existing notions of human
behavior do they use to create verisimilitude? What
political and social assumptions guide, however invisibly,
the construction of the narrative of police brutality?
II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT
A. The "Merely"Anecdotal
The idea of anecdote, understood in broader contexts,
can illuminate certain pervasive and crucial decisions
courts must make: when determining patterns and links
among individuals, when determining the scope of events,
221. 517 U.S 806 (1996) (holding evidence that police actions were based on
pretext irrelevant to a fourth amendment analysis, so long as police had actual
authority to take the actions they did).
222. Conroy, Shocking Truth, supra note 2, at 34 (quoting corporation
counsel characterizing the acts of John Burge after judgment was entered
against him and the city sought to avoid having to indemnify him).
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when determining what individuals and actions constitute
a governmental entity, and when crafting an opinion
describing the patterns it sees. Anecdote, as I will explain,
can act as both a useful description of, and in some respects
a corrective to, current understandings of the ways in which
courts comprehend patterns. More specifically, for the
purposes of this Article, it can help us think about why
judges so often view police brutality as anecdotal, nonsystemic, and a threat to the conventional narrative of a
few rotten apples in an otherwise pristine barrel. What is
the power of this story, and how should we understand the
refusal to make the connections among these incidents that
would open the way for change?
Questions of which details to include or highlight in a
particular story, as well as which to minimize or exclude,
are inescapable. A narrative can never be more than a
representation, a selection of details.2" Shaping a narrative
means determining what events and details are relevant,
which requires a standard of relevance. It means
determining how these events are connected to each other,
and to the whole, which requires both a notion of causality
and a standard for defining the whole. This standard is
most often supplied by the conventionalized norms of the
genre: the narrative structure "will not admit events or
other kinds of phenomena that do not 'belong to it and
" " Thus the storyteller will suppress any
preserve its laws'.
particulars that don't "fit the mold," that make the story
appear "ill-formed."22 He may not recognize that the
presence of the anecdotal can signal a need to re-evaluate
the existing narrative. As the work unfolds, new linkages
are revealed. The significance of the irrelevant detail may
become fully apparent only as the total structure of the
223. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey point out that until recently, social
scientists rejected narrative analysis as "an ambiguous, particularistic,
idiosyncratic, and imprecise way of representing the world." Patricia Ewick &
Susan Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of
Narrative,29 L. & SOCY REV.197, 198 (1995). This description is of course often
used about anecdotes as well.
224. SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE 21 (1978). See also Patricia
Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, supra note 223, at 213 (discussing the narrative's
ability to colonize consciousness); Martin Price, The Irrelevant Detail and the
Emergence of Form, in ASPECTS OF NARRATIVE 70-71 (J. Hillis Miller, ed. 1971);
Hayden White, The Value ofNarrativity in the Representationof Reality, in ON
NARRATvE 15 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981).
225. CHATMAN, supra note 224, at 22.
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story emerges."'
Anecdote is a literary term that comes weighted with
both positive and negative connotations. It is defined as a
"narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told
as being in itself interesting or striking."27 The anecdote is
a story with a point, or with "punch."2 8 The Romans
regarded anecdotes as a miniature art form.2 9 The term
calls to mind charming and memorable stories like those
Boswell told about Samuel Johnson.23 As 18th century
theorist Isaac D'Israeli wrote: "A well chosen anecdote
frequently reveals a character, more happily than an
elaborate delineation; as a glance of lightning 1 will
sometimes discover what has escaped us in full light." '
An effective anecdote is simple-it is a small but
polished story that emphasizes and even embellishes
salient and evocative details and disregards those that
might interfere with the moral or teaching point.23 Telling
an anecdote may have several salutary effects. It may bring
alive an otherwise dry teaching point, through its
evocativeness, and perhaps also through its appeal to
empathy. It may focus on experiences with which we can
connect on an emotional level. As David Simpson observed,
"We understand human nature not by its grand
appearances, but by the 'minute springs and little wheels'
that anecdotes reveal."2 3
However, the dangers of anecdote are also evident. The
anecdote may discard the wrong details. That is, instead of
226. See Price, supranote 224, at 70-71.
227. See THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 319

(1971).
228. Aristides, Merely Anecdotal, AMER. SCHOLAR, Spring 1992, 167, at 168
(citing Longford)
229. See ELIzABETH HAZELTON HAIGHT, THE ROMAN USE OF ANECDOTES IN
CICERO, Livy, & THE SATIRISTS 1 (1940).
230. See JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON (R.W. Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1970).
231. ISAAC D'ISRAELI, A DISSERTATION ON ANECDOTES 16 (Garland Publishing

Inc. 1972) (1793).
232. See THOMAS GILOviCH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLnBITY
OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 90 (1991) (describing a good story as one
whose message is emphasized and sharpened, whereas inessential details are

de-emphasized or leveled). Such stories become "simpler and cleaner.., not
encumbered by minor inconsistencies or ambiguous details." They are
informative and entertaining, and therefore worthwhile for both speaker and
listener. Id. at 91.
233. DAVID

SIMPSON,

LITERATuRE 55 (1995).

THE ACADEMIC POSTMODERN

AND

THE RuLE OF
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discarding the irrelevant, it may oversimplify." 4 It may

present itself as representative when it is not. Even without
an explicit claim of typicality, it may confuse listeners into
believing it is representative because it is so evocative and
memorable. 5
The "Reagan anecdote""5 epitomizes the danger, and
some of the ambiguity. The "Reagan anecdote" is a
masterful means of humanizing and emotionalizing

complex issues of policy." 7 It does so by oversimplifying, by
choosing unrepresentative stories and portraying them as
and, perhaps even by means of
representative,
fabrication." 8 Dinesh D'Souza called Reagan's anecdotes
"morality tales" whose effective "illustration of a broader
theme " M was not invalidated simply because some of its

details might be erroneous.'° Thus the term suggests both
an evocative and effective tool for communicating, and a

misleading and untrustworthy means to an end.

l

234. It has been described as "an all purpose put down device, which boxes
complicated issues and individuals into a single caption." James Wolcott, Hear
Me Purr,THE NEW YORKER, May 20, 1996, at 54, 58.

235. See generally Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort LitigationSystem-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147,
1159-61 (1992); see also infra note 249; William Glaberson, When the Verdict Is
Just a Fantasy,N.Y. TIMS, June 6, 1999, § 4, at Al (discussing $2.9 million cup
of coffee and other legal horror stories).
236. See Chris Satullo, Tiny Tales Can Bring Big Laws, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, May 15, 1995 at 7 ("The Great Communicator's gift was to reduce the
world to a simple, fervent vision, then sell it folksily. With that little toss of his
head and a twinkle in the eye, he would pause as if to say 'Let's dispense with
the oratory my speechwriters have foisted on me,' then launch into a pithy
anecdote spelled out on an index card.") One of President Reagan's best known
anecdotes was the story of the welfare queen who made $150,000 a year. See
Michael Lind, The Southern Coup, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1995, at 20.

237. This is not to suggest that President Reagan was either the first or last
practitioner of the art. See e.g. Michael Kramer, The Political Interest: Newt's
Believe It or Not, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 43 (describing Newt Gingrich as an
accomplished practitioner of the Reagan anecdote).
238. See Joan Didion, The Lion King, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Dec. 18, 1997 at
13 (reviewing RONALD REAGAN: How AN ORDINARY MAN BECAME AN
EXTRAORDINARY LEADER by DINESH D'SouzA); see also Herblock, Onstage With

Two Bit Players and a Superstar, WASH. POST, Dec 31, 1995 (reporting that
Reagan "told anecdotes that had no basis in fact, but they were good lines and
he kept using them").
239. Didion, supra note 238, at 13.
240. See id. at 16; see also GILOVICH, supra note 232, at 97 (arguing that an
effective story may stretch the facts in service of a greater truth).
241. See PAUL D. ERICKSON, REAGAN SPEAKS 32 (1985); Editorial, The
Anecdote Trap, WASH. POST, Mar 6, 1995, at A16.
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The use of anecdotes inevitably raises the problem of
representativeness. 2 Suzanna Sherry and Dan Farber
argue that "even if a story is true, it may be atypical of real
world experiences,"'
and that "to ignore the typicality
concern would be to allow an unrepresentative individual to
speak for a group, in effect silencing other members."'
Farber
and
Sherry
raise
their
concern
with
representativeness largely as a critique of critical race and
other 'outsider' scholarship and its use of first person
narratives." But this critique seriously underestimates the
pervasiveness of the representativeness issue.
Sherry and Farber's observation in fact describes an
inherent and unavoidable problem with all use of anecdotes
and indeed, most efforts at narrative coherence. Every
narrative is itself-unavoidably-based on a choice of
anecdotal events according to some standard of relevance,
and on assumptions about the causal connections among
these events. The tendency to make inferences about
whether characteristics or events are representative is an
integral part of our cognitive apparatus.24 6 What
psychologists term the "representativeness heuristic" is
one of a set of legitimate and absolutely essential cognitive
tools, which permit people to think beyond the information
given;
to form
inferences.2
In
particular,
the
representativeness heuristic permits people to estimate the
likelihood that an event or characteristic is part of a larger
category or class. 9 Like all inferences, it brings with it the
danger of error, but nevertheless it is a critical means of
242. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 59-117 (1945); Kenji
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1767 (1996).
243. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 838 (1993).
244. Id. at 839-40. See also David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and
Narrative, 73 IND. L. J. 797, 801 (1998).
245. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 244, at 838-40; see also Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further
Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REv. 647, 652 (1994).
246. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 38 (1980).
247. Id. at 18-28.
248. See id.
249. The other common judgmental strategy is the "availability heuristic,"
which permits people to estimate the relative likelihood that particular events
will recur. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 246, at 18-28.
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250

organizing our experience.
In the legal context, there is a danger that anecdotes,
divorced from any larger context and uninformed by
empirical data, will unduly influence the development of
legal policy. This is a danger which is decried, for example,
in the field of tort reform.251 As one commentator said,
statutes written in response to anecdotal reports may yield
highly complex codes that anticipate bizarre circumstances
while ignoring the commonplace circumstances citizens are
likely to encounter. 252 But there is a significant difference
between identifying the dangers of anecdote and dismissing
anecdote entirely, a difference some critics miss.
For example, one critic of the narrative turn in law
stated that because of problems in assessing truthfulness
and typicality, "scientists and medical researchers reject
anecdotal evidence."253 But in ways that are crucial for our
purposes, this statement is inaccurately broad. In the
sciences and social sciences, anecdotal evidence signals an
area ripe for further study, but by itself becomes merely
trivial.
and
unreliable
anecdotal-unscholarly,
anecdotal
study,
systematic
Unsupplemented by more
evidence allows only the weakest of inferences, because its
representativenesss cannot be determined.5 But when
accepted for what it is, anecdotal evidence is useful.255
Indeed, D'Israeli notes that neither the science of human
nature nor the science of physics progressed very far until
vague theory was supplemented by an anecdotal,
experimental dimension which did not divorce knowledge
from experience.256
In law-perhaps especially in law-the danger of the
unrepresentative anecdote exists in continual tension with
250. See NISBEir & Ross, id at 18-23. The authors note that it is almost
impossible to imagine how mental life would be managed without such
knowledge structures. See id at 38.
251. See, e.g., Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with EmpiricalData, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15, 21
(1992); Saks, supranote 235, at 1159.
252. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Methodological Realities: Social Science
Methods and Business Reorganizations,72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1291, 1295 (1994).
253. Hyman, supra note 244, at 801.
254. See Saks, supra note 235, at 1159.
255. See GILOVICH, supra note 232, at 58 (distinguishing the cognitive
processes involved in generating ideas from those involved in testing ideas).
256. See D'ISRAELI, supra note 231, at 27. See also SIMPSON, supranote 233,
at 58.
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a need for anecdotal evidence.257 Judge Posner observes that
the use of anecdote is inevitable in fields, like law, where
theory is weak.' But could it be otherwise? The common
law system proceeds largely by the use of anecdote, analogy
and case studies.25 9 Unlike physics, for example, in which
results can be laboratory tested, the results in law will
ultimately be tested by more experiential-anecdotaldata."' Anecdotal evidence is a way of learning about the
world "out there" 61 - "the society the law serves."262 It is a
way of testing theory to ensure it is grounded in reality, and
that it serves the purposes for which it was conceived.
There is a tension in the notion of anecdote. Is it a story
told because it is remarkable, or because it is a vivid and
essential representation of something broader? To the
extent it does seem remarkable, how can we be sure this is
not in fact a function of its failure to conform to familiar
stories, or accepted storytelling norms? How can we be sure
it is not a function of the storyteller's inability to see
connections among "anecdotes" which would, if understood,
convert the anecdotal to the systemic? For example, Joseph
Epstein tells the following anecdote about the Soviet Union:
its defenders were accustomed to dismissing the testimony
of dissident writers such as Boris Pasternak and Alexander
Solzhenitsyn as "merely anecdotal," and thus not to be
taken seriously. The anecdotal was posed against the
257. See Albert W. Alschuler, Explaining the Public Wariness of Juries, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 414-17 (1998) (aggregating data and examining central
tendencies is useful, but must exist in conjunction with examination of
anecdotal evidence and atypical cases).
258. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 827, 845 (1988).
259. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,
and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923
(1996); Posner, supra note 258, at 844-45; Saks, supra note 235, at 1159.
Indeed, the conventional notion of adjudication assigns great value to
individualized, case by case decisionmaking. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a
Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 277-79 (1990).
260. I recognize that these questions are not considered closed in the "hard"
sciences either. See generally SIPSON, supra note 233, at 42 (citing RICHARD
RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 164-66); Laurence Tribe, The Curvature
of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1989).
261. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 448 (1997) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
Stephen Gillers, Against the Wall, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 405, 406-07 (1993);
Sullivan, supra note 252, at 1293-94.
262. Gillers, supra note 261, at 407.
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"documentary," which meant the statistics and accounts
given out by the Soviet government. 63 Similarly, one
economist recently defined anecdotal as one of "the
26
customary derisive tags for heterodox economic ideas."
Anecdote, when well deployed, may be an effective tool in
challenging the authority or universality of the
conventional narrative. The greatest danger of the grand
narrative is that it ossifies. Without the pull of the
anecdotal, there is no way to assess the accepted story's
continuing viability in the face of new understandings and
new information. Its structural choices and assumptions
become invisible, and its narrative viewpoint masquerades
as omniscient.
The notion of anecdote may offer a partial corrective to
such false claims of omniscience. The anecdote provides a
temporary landing place, while reminding us that there is
always more to come.265 But in law, the continual
accumulation of detail, the temporary landing place, is not
always possible or desirable. Closure is an essential
element of storytelling, 26 6 and certainly of legal storytelling.
Judgment needs to be rendered. The difficulty is in
distinguishing those events which ought to be part of the
story from those which ought to be excluded.267
The challenge is to find a way to mediate between
instance and theory, between the anecdote and the larger
When ought a proposition be
narrative structure.2
submitted for more systematic study,269 when ought it be
perceived as a quirk or oddity, and when as sufficient notice
263. Aristides, supra note 228, at 168. See also STEPHEN GREENBLATT,
MARVELOUS

POSSESSIONS:

THE WONDER OF THE

NEW

WORLD

2

(1991)

(contrasting history told by anecdotes, or 'petite histoires' with history told
through 'grand recit')
264. John Cassidy, The Force of an Idea, NEw YORKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 32.
265. See SIMPSON, supra note 233, at 53. "There can be no whole, totalized
system, as long as we are dealing with real lives, and so the proper ambition is
one of continual accumulation without closure." Id. at 62.
266. See, e.g., FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING 127 (1967); Hayden
White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, CRITICAL
INQUIRY,

Autumn 1980, at 5-27.

267. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative,and Victim Impact Statements,
63 U. CHI. L. REv 361, 382-90 (1996) (discussing normative aspects of choosing
particular narratives).
268. See, e.g., JOEL FINEMAN, THE SUBJECTIVITY EFFECT IN WESTERN
LITERARY TRADITION 73 (1991).
269. See Frederick Schauer, The QuestionsofAuthority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 106
(1992).
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of a more recurrent problem which needs to be explored?
Conversely, when ought systematic, empirical evidence
stand on its own without the need for individual, anecdotal
stories of suffering or subjective intent?27 °
Narrative theory reminds us that these questions are
inescapably normative. Jurists and others who shape the
narratives of governmental misconduct are not faced with
mechanical and inflexible rules for determining the
narratives' construction, but with choices and contingencies
that are influenced but not dictated by cultural, historical
and political assumptions. There is no way to avoid
evaluating those assumptions and assessing both whether
they are the right assumptions, and whether they lead to
the right results.27 '
B. Some Assumptions That Help Shape Stories of Police
Brutality
My central thesis is that a number of unstated
assumptions interfere with the courts' ability or willingness
to see patterns, sequences, causal links, and systemic
coherence when they view allegations of governmental
misconduct. These assumptions sometimes lead courts
instead to a narrow view of connection, causality and plot,
under which conduct that ought272 to be viewed as part of a
coherent whole is instead rendered irrelevant and
fragmented. That which ought to be seen as part of a grand
narrative of official misconduct is instead marginalized as
270. See, e.g., Board of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397 (1997) (refusing to find municipality liable in absence of proof that
sheriff hired deputy with subjective knowledge that he was likely to violate this
particular plaintiffs civil rights); EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp
1264 (N.D. Il1. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding a statistical
pattern of discrimination insufficient in absence of stories of individual women);
Ewick & Silbey, supranote 223, at 206.
271. We share pre-conscious assumptions about causality, coherence,
relevance, motive, origin, and closure, and these unstated assumptions help
define the narrative structures we find followable and meaningful. Narrative
scholars disagree on many things, including the extent to which those
assumptions belong to reader or author and the nature of the assumptions
themselves (e.g., are they historical, moral, cultural, trans-cultural), but they do
agree that notions like "event;" "plot;" "ending" and "causal sequence" cannot
themselves explain how narrative coherence is achieved. See, e.g., CHATMAN,
supra note 224, at 43; Price, supranote 224; White, supra note 224, at 14.
272. See Bandes, supra note 267, at 385 (discussing the unavoidable moral
and political elements of decisions on which stories to tell).
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anecdotal.
There is a deep and basic human need for narrative
coherence, which may be threatened by what is perceived as
irrelevant detail. We share, as William James said, an
"indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational
shape in )),273
our minds than.., the crude order of our
experience.
Narrative stabilizes, or appears to stabilize, a
frighteningly complex world. In law, these tendencies are
magnified. The law itself embodies a striving for coherence
and order.275 Legal rules, presumptions, and thresholds can
easily disguise patterns and dismiss details that threaten
the continuity of the existing order. But they can also be
used to illuminate such patterns and details. At times
judges are open to challenges to existing governmental
systems. At times they will refuse to condone-even help
subvert-an
order
that
appears
unjust.7
But
overwhelmingly, the judicial system acts to turn away
systemic challenges to governmental wrongdoing.
When governmental misconduct is fragmented and
anecdotalized, it is less threatening and easier to dismiss.
When judges treat individuals who challenge the current
system as isolated actors and dismiss or vulgarize their
motives, or conversely, portray their actions as heroic and
special, they act to perpetuate the current system. My goal
in this section is to examine the background assumptions
and perspectives that shape courts' tendency to
anecdotalize government misconduct and thereby avoid
systemic reform.
273. William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, UNITARIAN REVIW
(1897), reprinted in THE wILL TO BELIEvE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR

PHIoSOPHY 145, 147 (Dover Publication Inc. ed., 1956).
274. See GaOVICH, supra note 232, at 9 (discussing the predisposition to see
order, pattern and meaning in the world).
275. The very notion of the social contingency of legal facts and norms may
seem to threaten the legal order by calling into question the objectivity of legal
judgments. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTIcE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 178

(1981).
276. Notable examples include the federal judges, including John Minor
Wisdom and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., whose decisions helped desegregate schools
and other institutions in the South. See, e.g., Jack Bass, John Minor Wisdom,
Appeals Court Judge Who Helped to End Segregation, Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1999, § 1, at 45; Robert D. McFadden, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judge
Whose Rulings Helped Desegregate the South, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1999, at A12.
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What follows does not purport to be a comprehensive
list of such assumptions. It is more in the nature of a
provisional list of working hypotheses. I will explain each of
them briefly. I will then examine them in detail in the
context of police brutality.
1. The Assumption that the Status Quo Is Essentially
Coherent and Just.This assumption stems from an inability
to imagine that things could be very different from what
they are-it sees the current governmental order not as
based on political and social choices, but rather as neutral,
natural, and nonpolitical. It reflects a (not necessarily
conscious) desire to perpetuate the current structure on the
part of those it has served well.277 But it is not only the
power elite that have a stake in viewing the current order
as coherent and just. Studies reveal a widely shared need
among the citizenry to believe that the world is just-that
those who are punished by the state (and even abused by
the police) have brought their fates upon themselves. 278 The
longstanding phenomenon of police brutality could not have
flourished without widespread acquiescence.
2. Selective Empathy. There is a human tendency to
understand and empathize with those most like us.279
Judges are not exempt from this tendency, which often
leads them to best understand and appreciate the
motivations of those who share their defining attributes,
such as class, gender, race, and prestige.28 ° Much of this
occurs on a subconscious level. When judges need to fill in
the blanks, for example, to make causal connections or
assign motivations, they will do so in a way that seems
natural and familiar to them. The danger for judges lies in
forgetting that their perspectives are necessarily partial,
and mistaking the dominant for the universal."1 Judges'
277. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Bd. of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); see also Reva Siegel, Why
Equal ProtectionNo Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (1997) (theorizing that the current
regime is unlikely to redistribute power or goods in a way that significantly
disadvantages non-subordinated groups).
278. See STAUB, supranote 200, at 79 (describing just world thinking).
279. See Bandes, supranote 267, at 376.
280. See id. at 375-82.
281. See id.
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lack of imaginative empathy may blind them to certain
motivations and make them too credulous of others. When
they mistake their own perspectives for universal truths,
they may feel too comfortable in dismissing, distorting, or
assimilating alternate perspectives.
3. The Fear of Destabilization and Chaos. The fear of
chaos is often expressed in the language of societal costs.282
The Supreme Court expresses concern that if it
acknowledges the possibility that certain pervasive
patterns exist, an entire system may need to be revamped.
The cost is seen as simply too great, and becomes itself a
value weighing against change. Justice Powell in McCleskey
v. Kemp" explicitly invokes the fear of destabilization as a
reason not to act, when he rejects the plaintiffs argument
that the administration of the death penalty is racially
biased.' He states: "[P]etitioner's claim, taken to its logical
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that
underlie the entire criminal justice system."28 McCleskey
begins from the premise that protecting lives and
preserving order is the highest value, and then concludes
that therefore it would simply be too destructive of this
value to recognize deep flaws in the criminal justice system.
Like the state court judge who refused to infer that police
are systematically evading the mandate of Mapp v. Ohio28
by fabricating their testimony, because that would be a
"frontal attack on the integrity of our entire law
enforcement system,"87 Justice Powell and four of his
brethren in McCleskey virtually plead not to be told,
because acting on such knowledge would be too
destabilizing. 8
Unrecognized selective empathy on the part of judges is
closely connected to both their desire to perpetuate the
282. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
283. 481 U.S. 252, 277 (1987).
284. See id. at 282.
285. Id.
286. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
287. People. v. Berrios, 270 N.E.2d 709, 713 (N.Y. 1971).
288. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIE, AND THE LAW 336-37 (1997).
'Powell's McCleskey opinion was haunted by anxiety over the consequences of
acknowledging candidly the large influence of racial sentiment in the
administration of capital punishment in Georgia." Id. at 338.

1999]

POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE COURTS

1321

status quo and their fear that disturbing the status quo will
lead to chaos. The judge is far more likely to identify with
the police officer and the law enforcement structure than
with the victim of police brutality. 9 But he may well
overlook the fact that he is exercising selective empathy,
and believe his perspective is universal. Thus he is able to
believe that because the current system is working well for
him and those like him, it must be working well in general,
and that those who challenge it must be unrepresentative
malcontents.29 He may also believe that to preserve such an
effective system is essential, and that to make systemic

changes to it would threaten not just the well-being of those

like him, but of society as a whole.29 '
The police officer's job is, at least in part, to preserve
law and order. The police may see themselves as the thin
blue line between order and the forces of crime, or as
soldiers in the war on crime.292 They may view themselves
as synonymous with "the law" and with the preservation of
order; and may view suspects as the enemy,23 or as out of
order. Unless they have been carefully and progressively
trained, they may perceive threats to their authority as

289. See Colbert, supra note 99, at 570 (noting that judges generally share
few demographic characteristics with most civil rights claimants); Conroy,
Town Without Pity, supranote 2, at 22 (noting that a judge may have an easier
time identifying with an erect and courageous torturer than with an unpopular
victim); see also Mills & Armstrong, supranote 7. The article quotes state court
Judge John J. Mannion, who refused to suppress the confession of Stanley
Howard despite allegations of police torture at Area Two, as saying, "Are you
going to believe Stanley over three police officers?" Id. The article reports that
Mannion is a former South Side police officer and Cook County assistant state's
attorney. Id.
290. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence,
EvidentiaryHabits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 162
(1992) (claiming that narrative "expectations are dependent on visions of
normality and aberration, drawn from experience" and "widely available stock
representations").
291. For example, as Tom Geraghty points out, judges (many of them former
police officers and prosecutors) may be willing to countenance police perjury out
of fear that the system would crumble if they could not rely on police testimony.
See Letter from Tom Geraghty, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, to
Susan Bandes, Sept. 16, 1999 (on file with author); see also infra note 328.
292. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 133.
293. See Worden, supra note 206, at 26. The author reviews psychological
literature identifying several types of law enforcement personalities, and
concludes that the "tough cop" who believes his role is primarily crime control,
as opposed to problem solving, is most likely to use force improperly. Id.
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threats to order itselfi -- and such perceived threats are a
major trigger for police brutality.2 S Charges of systemic
police brutality are themselves often perceived by police
supervisors, internal affairs investigators and even high
level officials like the police chief or the mayor, as threats?"
to the maintenance of order-since they may lead to
scandals that could "rock the department" and interfere
with its effectiveness at combating crime. As the Mollen
Commission found, widespread police brutality and
corruption was abetted by willfully blind supervisors who
of a corruption scandal more than
feared the consequences
297
the corruption itself.
To the extent judges see their role as enabling police to
do their jobs, and as helping to maintain order, they may
view accusations of systemic brutality as a threat to that
role.298 Why judges might view their role in that light is a
complex question, partly answered by the judicial fear of
chaos and destabilization. To ward off chaos, it becomes
crucial to preserve the grand narrative of a police force
keeping order effectively, and yet without losing its
integrity or abusing its discretion. To preserve this
narrative, judges must dismiss stories that would threaten
its coherence as irrelevant, incredible, or unrepresentative.
Thus, rather than welcome the chance to learn more about
and address problems of brutality, courts (like police and
politicians) tend to fend off allegations of systemic brutality,
perhaps viewing them as simply too dangerous.
Of course judges could buck the system if they chose,
294. CHEVINGY, supra note 33, at 140 (discussing tendency to view the
person who defies the police as presenting as much danger as a criminal does).
295. See Sontag & Barry, supra note 202 (reporting findings that perceived
challenges to police authority are often the predicate to police violence).
296. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supranote 1, at 186.
297. See Krauss, supra note 17. The prosecution is also closely aligned with
the police. They work together, and tend to see many of their interests as in
alignment. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 199; see also Davis, supra
note 70, at 289-91 (describing the symbiotic relationship between police and
prosecutors); Mike Allen, Chargeof MurderAgainst an Officer Stirs Debate on
Risk, N.Y. TuvEs, Feb. 17, 1999 at Al (reporting that local prosecutors who
charge police with crimes often rely daily on those same police to make cases
against other suspects.); Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side of a
Fair Trial, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, § 1, at 1 (discussing how prosecutors
sacrifice justice to win, and why winning becomes paramount).
298. See Colbert, supra note 99, at 561 (suggesting that most federal judges
are white, wealthy, male, and conservative and unsympathetic to civil rights
claims, particularly municipal liability claims).
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but in police brutality cases they are unlikely to do so. First,
it takes tremendous courage to buck the system in police
brutality cases. For a state judge to "side with" the
complainant and against the police is often political
suicide.299 Police superintendent Leroy Martin was
described as claiming that "to believe the department had a
brutality problem was to smear the sacrifices of officers who
have died in the line of duty."0 0 Judges may agree with this
sentiment, but even those who don't are well aware of its
power and prevalence."°' Even a life tenured federal judge
may have difficulty withstanding the wrath one incurs by
speaking the truth. Recall the reaction to Judge Harold
Baer's observation that people in the Washington Heights
section of New York City tend to fear and flee from the
police, whom they regard as "corrupt, abusive and
3 '° Judge Baer had worked on the Mollen
violent."
Commission, which had found rampant lawlessness,
corruption, and brutality among police in that very
neighborhood.0 3 Nevertheless, there were calls for his
impeachment from, among others, the Senate Majority
299. See, for example, the case of Judge Lawrence Passarella of Chicago.
When Judge Passarella acquitted a man of assault on a police officer, columnist
Mike Royko and others called for his ouster, Mike Royko, Cop's Verdict on
Judge Already In, Cm. TRB., Oct. 24, 1986, at 3. Passarella was then defeated
in his retention election, a highly unusual fate. See Joseph R. Tybor, Voters
Mete Out Harsh Judgments; Ouster of 3 Judges Unprecedented, CH. TRIB., Nov.
6, 1986, at 3. Several state court judges nominated by President Clinton for
federal judgeships have met with substantial opposition based on their
perceived softness on crime or insufficient opposition to the death penalty. For
example, Philadelphia Judge Frederica Massiah-Jackson's confirmation for a
federal judgeship was derailed largely based on charges that she was "antipolice and anti-prosecutor." Pete Leffier, Political Maelstrom Grows Over
Judgeship: Specter Insists Massiah-Jackson is 'Mainstream'; Moranelli and
Phila. DistrictAttorney Say She's Anti-Police, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Jan.
11, 1998, at Al. More recently, Judge Ronnie White of the Missouri Supreme
Court lost a confirmation vote, based on charges that he was soft on crime and
anti-death penalty. See Benjamin Soslds, White Out, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov.
1, 1999, at 14.
300. Leads, supranote 73.
301. Chevigny reports that in the early part of the century, lower court state
judges were beholden to the machine and thus would deliberately accept
perjured testimony from police, themselves cogs in the same machine.
CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 120.
302. United States v. Bayless, 913 F.Supp. 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
303. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17; Treaster, supra note
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Baer retracted his observation."5

On a less conscious level, judges are unlikely to buck
the system because they see themselves as part of it.
Judges, like police officers, may have a strong
temperamental disposition toward the preservation of
order. Robert Cover said:
[A] judge is educated to think in terms of the values underlying
legality and ordered processes. His education, his colleagueship
with others of similar training, his day to day experience with
those processes, lead him to be more alert than most to the
potential dangers of the law. Moreover, because so much of his
own life integrates those values, he is, himself, threatened by
30
threats to them. He is slippage.
quite likely
to react when they are under
feels
attack or when he

In addition, judges often have a strong identification
with governmental actors, such as police officers.0 7 Their
selective empathy is not hard to understand, in many cases.
For example, Andrew Wilson was a convicted killer of two
cops,0 8 whom he evidently attacked without provocation;
Commander Burge was a decorated war hero, and a high
ranking officer with several commendations for bravery.
Empathy in such a situation would tend to flow toward the
officer. In other cases, the selective empathy rests on
grounds that are harder to admit. 10 For example, although
most of Burge's victims were not accused of murder, all
were easily marginalized-black,
ghetto dwelling,
sometimes gang members, and often unemployed. And
indeed, one of the purposes of police brutality is to
dehumanize its victims; to treat them as objects to whom no
empathy is due. 1'
304. See Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism';
ConservativesBlock Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at A8.

305. See Bayless, 921 F. Supp. at 211.
306. ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 224 (1975).
307. See supratext accompanying notes 289-91.
308. People v. Wilson, 506 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Ill. 1987).
309. See Conroy, House of Screams, supra note 2, at 22.
310. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the CriminalLaw,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (discussing judicial difficulty with
acknowledging racist beliefs); Charles R. Lawrence HI, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
321 (1987) (discussing difficulties with purposeful discrimination requirement).
311. See, e.g., Lester, supranote 35, at 183.
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Commander John Burge told Melvin Jones, one of his
torture victims: "No court and no State are going to take
your word against a Lieutenant's word."312 Much police
brutality takes place in secret-in interrogation rooms and
back alleys.1 3 Because of brutality's secret nature, the
motivation and credibility of those involved becomes
paramount in resolving the swearing contests that are an
endemic feature of brutality claims.314 The courts must,
literally, fill in the blanks when they decide whether to
believe the police officer or the complainant. Who has a
motive to lie, and who is more likely to be telling the
truth?' 5 Courts will often fill in the blanks with what seems
familiar and right to them.1 6
The divide between the upstanding officer often from
the same class and race as the judge, 1 7 and the
marginalized victim, is typical in police brutality cases, and
in torture cases in general. It is a divide between those like
us and those we may not see as completely human; it is also
a divide between those we believe would preserve stability
and those we believe would destroy it; between those
fighting the war on crime, and, by clear implication, those
who are enemies of the state. John Conroy writes:
Ifin societies where torture occurs, the tortured class is usually not
312. Stainthorp, supra note 87, at 3-15.
313. See, e.g., Bumiller & Thompson, supra note 65 (noting that the four
officers involved in the shooting of Amadou Diallo were the only witnesses to
the incident).
314. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 106, at 6 (pointing out that in most
complaints filed with OPS in 1998, allegations could not be proved or disproved,
usually because the investigators had only the conflicting testimony of police
officers and suspects). See also supratext accompanying notes 87-96.
315. Bill Nolan, president of the Chicago unit of the Fraternal Order of
Police, summed it up this way: "These guys are all murderers. They were all
guilty, and now they're looking for a way to get out of jail, so they're blaming
John Burge." Martha Irvine, Inmates: Police Coerced Confessions, 10 on Chicago
Death Row Say They Were Beaten Under Burge, PEORIA J. STAR, July 5, 1999, at
B3.
316. The result (at least as of this writing) in the Louima federal civil rights
case is instructive. One officer was convicted, and another pled guilty when
conviction seemed certain. As to both defendants, police testimony corroborated
the allegations of brutality. Officers indicted for another alleged incident of
brutality against Louima, this one in a police car, were acquitted. In that case,
no corroborating police testimony was offered. See Justice in New York City, ST.
PETERSBURG TnIES, June 12, 1999, at 16A.
317. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 239 (discussing white, male
institution of police); supranotes 289-98.
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held in much respect; the victims are rarely the pillars of the
community, but rather its agitators, its poor, its heretics, and
those viewed as a threat to the society at large. Torturers, on the
other hand, often represent popular belief. It is not unusual for
them to come from the rank of honored military men who have
served their country in time of need.... A judge or jury choosing
between an erect and courageous torturer and an unpopular
victim often has an easier time identifying with the torturer.

What is problematic about judicial selective empathy in
these cases is that it is invisible to the judges themselves,
and often to those who read judicial opinions. Thus the
alignment with the police and prosecution is portrayed and
viewed as neutral decision making, 19 and deviations from it
are viewed as ideological or political. The preservation of
the status quo, which perpetuates police methods that
almost exclusively harm the underclass,320 seems both
important and just to those who are unharmed.
In the context of police brutality, the status quo may
seem just if the bad actors get their just desserts, even if it
isn't done "by the book." This is a recurring theme in the
study of police brutality. 2 ' Officers report that the not very
subliminal message, beginning at the academy and
constantly reinforced thereafter, is to get the collars in any
way possible. We are familiar with this ethic, which is so
deeply embedded in popular culture that it is called the
"Dirty Harry" syndrome. 22 Perjury and brutality are
obviously acceptable, even necessary, ways of getting the
job done, and those who engage in them are assured
protection from the top down. Perjury is an essential
handmaiden to police brutality. It takes the passive forms of
refusal of officers, even supervising officers, to rat on their
compatriots or discipline those under their supervision. But
it also takes the active forms of covering up wrongdoing,"
318. Conroy, Town Without Pity, supranote 2, at 22.
319. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the
Law," 10 CARDozo L. REv. 3, 11 (1988) (discussing the judge's "visceral

temptation to help prosecute the criminal"); see also Bandes, supranote 267, at
368-69.
320. See Lester, supra note 35, at 83 (citing studies that consistently find
blacks most dissatisfied with the police).
321. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 7.
322. Id. at 7.
323. See id.; Chin & Wells, supra note 26, at 234-35; Kramer, supra note 98.

324. See, e.g., Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1232 (5th Cir.
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25
and of lying under oath."
And so judges are implicated. It has often been
observed that judges routinely turn a blind eye to "even
27

incredible

2

6

police perjury,

implicitly

condoning it.

Judges may view police abuse as a necessary evil that
allows them to put away bad actors rather than let them
escape on technicalities.328 They may also see a certain
amount of police misconduct as necessary for the
maintenance of order. The perjury shields them from facing
the point at which the force crosses the line and becomes
brutality. Or perhaps, as Robert Cover describes in his
brilliant study of antislavery judges enforcing the fugitive
slave laws, they have convinced themselves that the law
allows them no choice.2 9
Even if judges convince themselves that brutality is a
necessary cost of obtaining convictions, it is not clear what
thought processes they use in a case like Andrew Wilson's.
Wilson's civil suit had no bearing on his incarceration, but
3
sought damages for police torture.1
The civil suit raises the

even more unpalatable explanation that "just desserts" may
include extra-legal punishment, like police beatings. There
is ample evidence that police administer brutality as
summary punishment, of a particularly dehumanizing and
racialized sort."' But there is no acceptable answer to the
question of why a judge would condone such behavior,
particularly on an ongoing basis.

1982) (discussing using throw down guns to disguise wrongful use of deadly
force); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?,27 HARV
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465,487 (1992).
325. See Rudovsky, supra note 324, at 486; see also David Kocieniewski,
Police ProsecutorClaims Cover-Up in Beating Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1998, at
A25 (reporting that New York City Police sergeant assigned to prosecute
officers accused of brutality filed federal suit charging that commanders ordered
him to cover up evidence of wrongdoing, and punished him when he refused to
do so).
326. Rudovsky, supranote 324, at 488. See also supranote 291.
327. See, e.g,. Chin & Wells, supra note 26, at 264-65; Cloud, supra note 26,
at 1345, 1356.
328. See Rudovsky, supranote 324, at 467.
329' See COVER, supra note 306, at 213-16 (discussing the judicial rhetoric
of inevitability).
330. Even when Wilson prevailed, he would never see a dime, since his
award would go straight to the families of his victims. See Conroy, Shocking
Truth, supra note 2, at 1.
331. See CHEVIGNY, supranote 33, at 11.
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4. The Need for Individual Stories of Motive, Fault,
and Blame. Robert Cover said: "Every narrative is insistent
in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral."3 2 The
demand for a clear moral point often carries with it the
demand for uncomplicated villains, who have deliberately
done bad things to good people. That is, when harm occurs,
but is not set in motion by malevolence, the reader may find
the story lacks verisimilitude; she might find the harm was
unlikely to have been caused in the way described.
These storytelling conventions are highly problematic
when governmental misconduct is alleged. For several
reasons, the insistence on motive-on deliberate, bad faith
wrongdoing-can only serve to disaggregate governmental
misconduct. First, complex governmental entities like police
departments, unlike people, don't have motives-they act
with an impersonal face. Second, even the individuals who
constitute government operate from a variety of
motivations, not often directed at particular individuals."3
Finally, much governmental misconduct is inaction, or a
web of interlocking actions and inactions, which do not fit
comfortably within the standard morality tale's paradigm of
malevolent individuals causing harm by singling out
innocent victims."
Police brutality can flourish because so many
individuals and institutions are willing to delegate, look the
other way, fail to act, and make sure they do not know what
has occurred before, or in some other department.335 Street
332. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1983).
333. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980)

(discussing "systemic injuries that result not so much from the conduct of any
single individual, but from the interactive behavior of several governmental
officials, each of whom may be acting in good faith"). See also Susan Bandes,
Monell, Parratt,Daniels and Davidson:Distinguishinga Custom or Policy from
a Random, UnauthorizedAct, 72 IowA L. REv. 101, 126-27 (1986); [hereinafter
Bandes, Distinguishinga Custom]; Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2317-23 (1990) [hereinafter Bandes, Negative

Constitution].
334. The innocent victim part of the tale is also important. The fact that so
many victims of police brutality are not only part of marginalized groups, but

also in many cases charged with serious crimes, members of gangs, persons
with prior criminal records, makes them a poor fit for the standard conception
of the innocent victim.
335. In The Shocking Truth, for example, Conroy writes about Assistant
Corporation Counsel Forti, who is now arguing that the actions of the
defendants in the Wilson case were outrageous, shocking, and unique:
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level cops make large numbers of small, disconnected
decisions, rarely documented, and subject to minimal
review."' In some cases these decisions are guided, at least
in theory, by written policies or legal constraints. 37 More
often, they are guided by priorities communicated less
overtly. Indeed, the failure to promulgate specific policies
protects policymating officials and keeps responsibility and
blame at low levels. 8 It perpetuates the appearance that
street level officers are making autonomous, disconnected
decisions. But in fact, administrative norms are clearly
communicated through less traceable channels. Police learn
what it means to be a good cop through the behavior of
their colleagues and supervisors, through observing how
things are done what is rewarded, what is punished, and
what is ignored. 89 An occasional expression of official shock
at "isolated instances" of brutality can only be viewed
cynically when cops known for their brutality receive
sterling personnel reports which fail to even mention their
infractions, 34 0 and in fact are promoted, commended, and by
all objective
indicia, highly valued in the departmental
3 41

culture.

Forti says he doesn't know the facts of the other Area Two cases. He
wants to confine all discussion to what the corporation counsel's office
is charged with doing in the Wilson case, and in his mind his
arguments are logical, consistent with the law, and the best course for
city taxpayers. The fact that the corporation counsel's outrage is
expressed in this, the single case of electric shock that threatens the
city's wallet, is merely indicative that the office is doing its job in this
single case-he is familiar with no others.
Conroy, Shocking Truth, supra note 2, at 33.
336. See generally PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983).
337. For example, the decrease in the use of deadly force against nondangerous suspects came about largely through cooperation from police chiefs.
See CHEVIGNY, supra note 33, at 7.
338. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 171-74 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); SCHUCK, supra note 336, at 104 (describing skewed
incentives toward inaction); SKOLNiK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 203-04
(describing decision by some police departments not to adopt specific policies in
order to avoid liability); Bandes, Distinguishinga Custom, supra note 333, at
120-27.
339. See Kramer, How Cops Go Bad, supra note 98, at 77 (describing the
messages transmitted at the police academy and on the street).
340. This is so even when the city repeatedly pays out substantial
judgments in civil cases to settle claims against officers accused of brutality. See
SKOLNIK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 205; infra text accompanying notes 380-85.
341. See Bob Herbert, A Cop's View, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1998, § 4 at 17
(reporting that instead of cracking down on... volatile, dangerous young cops,
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Section 1983's 42 legislative history reflects that it was
meant to address the justice system's willful blindness to
crimes against the powerless.' Yet municipal liability law,
which theoretically permits systemic challenges to
unwritten policies which cause constitutional harm, has
become increasingly inhospitable to claims of systemic

inaction. Although in City of Canton v. Harris,4 the

Supreme Court held that policies of failure to train or
supervise could be actionable, it demanded a showing that
the failures were attributable to the deliberate indifference
of policymakers. The recent case of Bryan County v.
Brown34 further heightened the requirement, demanding a
showing that the policymaker was deliberately indifferent
to the risk that "this officer was highly likely to inflict the
particularinjury suffered by plaintiff."348 Failure to act, in
itself, is simply not seen as a possible cause of harm. Yet
government can cause widespread misery, and has, by its
failures to screen police officers properly, its failures to
train them correctly, and its failures to discipline them for
their wrongdoing.
The conventional story of blame and purposeful
misconduct dangerously misdescribes the way governmental misconduct works, by disaggregating it into a series
of individual, anecdotal acts. Government causes harm not
through the misdeeds of a single malevolent person who
wants to harm a specific individual, but through the
collective decisionmaking of numerous people, many of
Few have to
whom may be acting in good faith.
incentives are
all
the
because
faith,
in
bad
act
affirmatively
skewed in favor of simply not acting at all. 45 In the Burge
the department frequently goes out of its way to reward them).
342. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
343. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Colbert, supra note 99,
at 504.
344. 487 U.S. 378 (1989).
345. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
346. Id. at 412. This demand parallels that in McCleskey, in which a
statistical pattern of racially discriminatory decisions in capital cases was
dismissed because plaintiffs could not show that this particular state system
intended to put this capital defendant to death because of his race. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 306 (1987).
347. See Bandes, Negative Constitution, supra note 333, at 2323; David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP.CT. REV. 271, 308.
348. See SCHUCK,supranote 336, at 104.
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case, the list of people and entities who "simply" failed to
act is staggering, including the other officers and
supervisors at Area Two, certain doctors and other
personnel at the County Hospital, certain employees at the
County Jail, members of the Office of Professional
Standards, the State's Attorney's Office, several Chiefs of
Police, the mayor of Chicago, and the U.S. Attorney's Office,
among others. The courts were particularly complicit in
ensuring that all these actors, themselves included, could
avoid knowing of the systematic nature of the brutality. 49
The fact that none of these persons or institutions had
singled out any one of the more than sixty torture victims in
order to inflict punishment on him in particular does little
to assuage their responsibility for allowing the punishment
to continue.
The Supreme Court has made motive crucial in certain
contexts, such as municipal liability350 and equal
protection. 5 ' In these contexts, plaintiffs are caught in a
bind when courts demand proof of certain motivations, like
racial animus, only to either erect impossible roadblocks to
obtaining the information or to recoil from the proof when
offered.3 1 Conversely, when victims of police misconduct
have sought to prove improper motives on the part of law
enforcement agents, as in the case of pretextual arrests, the
Court has claimed an unwillingness to inquire into
motivation.353 This is a particularly unfortunate development in the effort to contain police brutality. A significant
amount of the brutality on the streets begins with
pretextual arrests, and most such activity targets minority
citizens." The effect of the Court's Whren ruling was to
349. For example, through protection of police personnel and disciplinary

records from discovery, and through the practice of granting motions in limine
and protective orders to prevent dissemination of such records, even once
discovered. Conversation with Flint Taylor, People's Law Office attorney for
several of those alleging police brutality, Feb. 13, 1998. See also Patton, supra
note 23.
350. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397
(1997).
351. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
352. See Lawrence, supranote 310, at 321.
353. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
354. See Jennifer A. Larrabee, DWB (Driving While Black) and Equal
Protection-theRealities of an UnconstitutionalPolice Practice, 6 J.L. & POLY
291, 296-99 & nn.27-39 (1997) (citing statistics).

1332

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

establish a basically irrebuttable presumption that an
officer with probable cause to arrest-even if he arrests for
an illegal left turn with the intent to search for drugs-is
acting in good faith.
In several other ways, courts and administrative
agencies have adopted presumptions that cast police
35
officers as public servants acting only from pure motives,
while casting brutality complainants as untrustworthy, self
serving, and acting from vulgar motives.3 .. The paradigmatic statement of the courts' view is Justice (then Judge)
Burger's statement in Bush v. United States, 57 that "it
would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the
under
guardians of its security are called to testify in court 358
oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion."
In this view, the police are not individual actors, some
of whom may sometimes perjure themselves, nor are they
members of a police force that has a particular agenda and
a particular job to do,359 but rather they are representative
of society as a whole. Admitting that police may act with
partiality or with a particular agenda would render them
ideological and unrepresentative. Moreover, in this view it
would reflect poorly on us all. The message is clear. Police
officers act as nonideological civil servants. If one doesn't,
he must be a rogue cop, unrepresentative and irrelevant.
Occasionally, someone points out that this may not be the
case. Justice Rizzi, in overturning the conviction of Gregory
Banks, observed:
355. For example, OPS and other agencies that investigate misconduct
complaints habitually "give great deference to police officers and are extremely
cynical about complainants." CHEVIGNY, supranote 33, at 92.
356. One prospective juror reported that she and others were excused for
cause because they expressed skepticism about police conduct. See Dorothy M.
Zellner, Letter to the Editor, Skeptics Kept off Juries,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1997,
at A18. Yet at least one federal circuit rejects a per se rule that attorneys must
be permitted to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of
the testimony of law enforcement officers when the government's case depends
wholly on the testimony of law enforcement agents. See United States v.
Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996).
357. 375 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
358. Id at 604. As Albert Alschuler observed, the problem is not the courts'

failure to adopt a blanket presumption that police testimony should be viewed
with suspicion, but their adoption of a blanket presumption that such testimony
is trustworthy. See Letter from Albert Alschuler, Professor of the University of
Chicago Law School, to Susan Bandes, Mar. 11, 1999 (on file with author).
359. See SKOLNIK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 198 (observing how courts treat
police as professionals with their own standards and rules).
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[We] bear in mind that in a criminal case the police are considered
part of the prosecution team. Thus, when there is a motion to
suppress because of alleged police coercion or racial intimidation,
the trial judge must maintain a conscious awareness that the
testimony of police is not to be viewed in isolation as if they have
no interest in the outcome of the case. Rather, the testimony must
be examined by the trial judge with the same scrupulous eye that
one would expect the trial judge to use to assay the testimony of a
party to the lawsuit.

While police officers are viewed as acting without bias,
complainants are seen as having an axe to grind. If the
police are seen as speaking for all of "us," then
complainants can be easily distanced and seen as speaking
only from their own narrow self interest. In the words of
two of the members of the Area Two torture ring:
Defendants fabricate exotic allegations in a desperate attempt to
undo their confessions. The prospect of a life sentence or the death
penalty can make a defendant particularly creative.... It's a lot of
fun to make stuff up.... If you look at all the allegations coming
down the trail, you find everyone who gives a statement says we
did something to them.

Complainants are suspect because they have been
charged with a crime3 62 and are trying to suppress a
confession, or because they have a criminal record, or are
affiliated with a gang, or because, for racial, social, and
economic reasons, judges find it difficult to empathize with
their plights. Sometimes they are suspect simply because
they have complained. The very act of challenging the police
seems to suggest an unhealthy lack of respect for authority

360. People v. Banks, 549 N.E.2d at 766, 770 (Ill. 1989).
361. Nelson, supranote 72.
362. This raises the problem that often police charge brutality suspects with
a crime in order to discourage the bringing of charges, in order to have
something to trade for the dropping of charges, or just simply in order to
retaliate. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?
in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 35, at 247. Professor Cheh notes that police and
prosecutors often follow the time honored practice of discharging
misdemeanants on condition of a release of civil liability (a practice upheld by
the Supreme Court in Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)) and
that often the charges-such as assault or resisting arrest-were brought by
police during the brutality incident. See id. at 267. See also CHEVIGNY, supra
note 33, at 50 (discussing practice of charging brutality complainants).

1334

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

and order."'3 Thus, just as challenging the police acts as a
trigger for brutality, it also acts as a barrier to the
credibility of those who complain about that brutality.
Finally, issues of motivation are important in
determining who has standing to challenge policies that
encourage brutality-in other words, who gets to tell the
story, and on behalf of which group? We have seen that
often the courts will disaggregate police conduct, portraying
each brutal cop as an isolated rotten apple. Conversely, the
courts may aggregate police as a class (or even as societal
representatives), raising the stakes for those who would
challenge police credibility or motives. When individuals
seek to challenge police conduct, they may be grouped in
pernicious or stereotypic ways-as suspects, gang members,
or members of other easily marginalized groups., Again
conversely, they will be disaggregated when they seek to
represent groups larger than themselves.
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,"5 for example, the Court
was unable to accept that Adolph Lyons, a black male living
in Los Angeles who had been subjected to a police
chokehold, had a claim of future injury. Despite ample
evidence that the chokehold was used primarily on black
men in the South Central area of Los Angeles,.. the Court
would not recognize either that Lyons himself had a
tangible fear of being choked again, or that he had
sufficient connection with other members of the black
community in Los Angeles to permit him to litigate an issue
that was certain to continue to affect members of that
community."7 In this way, the Court rejects or vulgarizes

363. See Sontag & Barry, supra note 202. See also CHEVIGNY, supra note 33,

at 43, 74 (documenting brutality against those who defy or criticize the police).
364. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22 (illustrating this tendency in

the Area Two cases).
365. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
366. See CIEVIGNY, supranote 33, at 45.
367. For a most effective illustration of the extent to which police brutality
affects black and other minority communities, see Felicia R. Lee, From Some
Parents,Warnings About Police, N.Y. TMS, Oct. 23, 1997, at A18. Lee reports
that "much as all parents broach sensitive topics like AIDS and sexuality or

drug use, black and Hispanic parents say they talk to their children about
dealing with the police. It is just a matter of time, they tell them, before they
encounter a police officer who sees dark skin as synonymous with crime. They
coach them on how to behave.., most said they began the lessons when their
children were 9 or 10..." Id.
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motivations based on linked fate,3" or membership in a
community, or transforms them into individualized
interests in the plaintiffs own welfare or aggrandizement.
5. The Assumption that the Common Law Attributes
Provide the Paradigmfor Public Law Cases. The common
law paradigm, as I have discussed elsewhere in detail,369
assumes the attributes possessed by private law cases in
the early stages of the common law. The notion of atomistic,
equally placed individuals, engaged in a bipolar contest for
pecuniary stakes, with linear causation, impelled by
traditional motives, and completely redressible by damages,
is a notion that has done immeasurable harm when used to
describe the harms inflicted by government. 7 °
The common law model misportrays government,
thereby thwarting governmental reform. For example it
demands simple and direct causal chains which rarely exist
in the complex administrative state,.7' it assumes that the
individual plaintiff is on equal footing with the
governmental defendant372 and it calls for stories of motive
and fault which fit poorly with the usual governmental
choices "more often made by the interaction of several
people acting in good faith than by a single malevolent
person." 7 '
The bipolar model portrays a contest between two
adversaries, in which causal links are linear and easy to
trace. (A put his fence on B's property, causing B to lose the
use of that property). Common law causality bears little
resemblance to the complex ways in which governmental
entities cause harm. Governmentally caused harm hews
more closely to a probabalistic model, in which a complex
ongoing entity causes a predictable amount of ongoing
368. See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN
AFRicAN-AmERICAN POLITICS 76-81 (1994) (discussing the use of a "linked fate"
construct to measure the degree to which African-Americans believe that their
own self interests are linked to the interests of the race).
369. See Bandes, Negative Constitution, supranote 333, at 2317-23.
370. See id. at 2320-23.
371. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
372. See, for example, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), in

which the Court elides the question of how plaintiffs are to obtain records of
prosecutorial decisionmaking.
373. Bandes, Negative Constitution,supranote 333, at 2323.
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harm, but the particular recipients of that harm are not
predictable.374 As long as the Los Angeles Police Department
continued to authorize the application of chokeholds as a
means of ensuring compliance, it was virtually certain that
some percentage of its recipients would die.37 It was
impossible, however, to predict with certainty which
individuals would be choked and die, just as it was
impossible to predict with certainty which police officers
would inflict the deadly chokeholds.
Nor are plaintiff and defendant on equal footing when
one of the litigants is the government. For example,
government has monopoly control over vast stores of
information-including police reports, personnel, and disciplinary files, court records,3 7 6 and the ability to withhold
or seriously delay litigants' access to that information. In
the police brutality context, police departments use that
ability as an essential tool for fighting off oversight and
intervention. 7 Moreover, government possesses virtually
unlimited resources. This means, for example, that it can
litigate strenuously and at great length. In Andrew
Wilson's civil suits, the plaintiffs attorneys, members of a
small civil rights firm, "labored for nine years without a
paycheck while the city steadily paid more than $850,000
to... private attorneys who defended the police, and spent
hundreds of thousands of dollars more on its own
defense."378 It is not surprising, especially given the high
odds against recovery, that few lawyers are available to
bring civil suits in police brutality cases.379

374. One scientist explained the problem by analogizing to the reasons why
the average gambler always loses out to the average casino owner. He said that
the gambler attempts to predict the individual and unpredictable spins of the
roulette wheel, while the owner concerns himself with the quite predictable
average outcome. Sarah Boxer, Science Confronts the Unknowable, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1998, at A15 (quoting Ralph E. Gomory in SC. AM., 1995).
375. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 1, at 42; see also Hoffman, supra note
180, at 1513 (stating that the Christopher Commission report "documented

patterns of abuse that would support a reasonable fear by all young African
American and Latino males in LA of abuse at the hands of the LAPD or Los
Angeles Sheriffs Department in a wide variety of settings").
376. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 23, at 761 (describing the legal barriers to
discovery of police discipline and personnel files, and suggesting that state

judges tend to deny discovery motions for fear of offending police departments).
377. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supranote 9, at 46-49.
378. Conroy, The Shocking Truth, supra note 2, at 31.
379. See Rudovsky, supranote 324, at 490.
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Alternatively, if government does not wish to litigate at
great length, it can use its unlimited resources to settle case
after case. The statistics on settlements in various cities tell
similar stories.38 In New York City, for example, the city
paid almost $20 million annually in settlements in 1995
and 1996, and more than $27 million in 1997.311 In 1997, the
city settled 503 police misconduct cases, and tried only 24.82
In 1998, the city paid out over $31.2 million.383 The city

routinely pays tens of thousands of dollars to abuse
complainants, but rarely investigates their allegations, and
"the officers named in their lawsuits almost always
continue working without scrutiny or punishment." In
other words, the government can operate on a "pay as it
goes" basis, making no effort to learn from the settlements,
to address the systemic flaws that make them
much less 385
necessary.
The focus on money damages is yet another attribute of
the common law system. The Supreme Court's unfavorable
rulings in suits like Adolph Lyons' injunctive action against
the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) chokehold
policy, or Rizzo v. Goode, 88 in which plaintiffs were denied
standing to seek structural reforms of the Philadelphia
Police Department,3 87 have forced police brutality plaintiffs
380. See Andrew Martin, Daley Backs Officers in Death of Honduran, Cm.
TRIB., Feb. 5, 1998, § 2, p. 1 (reporting that since 1992, the City of Chicago has

paid more than $29 million to settle 1,657 lawsuits alleging police misconduct
and brutality. The average cost of the settlements was about $17,500). See also
$24 Million is Paid in Suit on 36 Arrests in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1998, at A21 (noting that an award was paid by Los Angeles County to SamoanAmerican partygoers who were wrongfully arrested and in some cases beaten,
but the Sheriffs Department had not yet disciplined the deputies involved in
the melee).
381. See Sontag & Barry, supranote 202.
382. See id.
383. See Editorial, Broken Kneecaps Policing,THE NATION, Oct. 11, 1999, at
3 [hereinafter Broken Kneecaps].
384. Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Police Complaints Settled, Rarely
Resolved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at Al (reporting also that the Los Angeles
Sheriffs Department now uses information from civil claims to help identify
troublesome police officers and patterns and misconduct, and the number of
lawsuits against the department has dropped substantially).
385. An editorial in THE NATION points out that the money for these
settlements, in most cities, comes not from the police budgets but from the
general coffers. When San Francisco began taking the funds from police
budgets, payouts dropped dramatically. See Broken Kneecaps, supranote 383.
386. 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976).
387. See id.
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to file damage claims instead of seeking the appropriate
system-wide declaratory and injunctive relief. When harm
is tangible and easily monetized, when plaintiffs are
motivated solely by the desire to be made whole financially,
and when defendants are individual wrongdoers, damages
are a perfectly satisfactory remedy. Yet when systemic
governmental harm exists, damages are generally a highly
unsatisfactory way to address it. The settlement pattern
illustrates why: it is often far easier to ask the taxpayers to
pay and pay than to take the politically risky position that
the police department has to change its wrongful
practices.3"
At bottom, the common law paradigm is based on the
notion of each litigant as an autonomous actor, impelled by
rugged, even heartless, individualism.389 The paradigm
dictates that a plaintiff charging police brutality will be
seen as motivated solely by greed or fear for his own wellbeing, that he can be easily bought off by money, that he
has no long term concerns for good government or
community,3 9 and that his adversary is an individual like
him, of equal power and similar motivations. According to
this paradigm, police brutality litigation can be nothing
more than a contest between two individuals, with money
as the prize-a story that begins and ends with each
isolated incident.
6. The Preference for Judicial Insulation. This terrain
has been brilliantly explored by Robert Cover in Justice
Accused. 91 Judges utilize many devices to assure
themselves and others that they have no choice but to
affirm the status quo, including, in Cover's words,
"elevation of the formal stakes," "retreat to a mechanistic
formalism," and "ascription of responsibility elsewhere." 9 '

388. See Hoffman, supranote 180, at 1509.
389. See Bandes, Negative Constitution,supra note 333, at 2316-23.
390. See Mary I. Coombs, SharedPrivacy and the FourthAmendment, or the
Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1635 (1987) ("[A] view of the
world that recognizes the essential interconnectedness of people and the
importance of intimacy and sharing is foreign to the atomistic social theory
underlying the Court's present doctrine").
391. See COVER, supra note 306 (exploring the means by which antislavery

judges dealt with the conflict between their moral values and their perceived
duty to uphold fugitive slave laws).
392. Id. at 229-38.
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Cover speaks of the helplessness to which judges lay claim
when they wish to deflect responsibility for a difficult
choice. "' Though he does not describe these devices as
wholly conscious, he certainly suggests that judges have
other choices open to them. When a judge refuses to disturb
the status quo, he may experience himself as not having
acted at all, which seems a good 3 9deal
safer than
4
affirmatively acting to change the system.
The failure of judges to take a stand against police
brutality is, in some ways, the most intractable piece of the
puzzle. As Robert Cover said, the "statist, apologist"
orientation is not preordained. Judges can, and sometimes
do, act in resistance to an unjust social order.395 In the police
brutality context, moreover, there is no federal Fugitive
Slave Act to hinder moral action. Instead, moral action is
evaded through a good deal of judicial creativity, willful
blindness and refusal to accept responsibility.
The Supreme Court has set the tone particularly in City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 96 In that opinion, the Court made
ample use of two of Cover's responsibility mitigating
mechanisms: the retreat to a mechanistic formalism and
the ascription of responsibility elsewhere.397 These
mechanisms permitted the Court both to disaggregate
systemic conduct and to avoid dealing with its ugly
consequences. The Court disaggregated systemic conduct in
several ways. As Justice Marshall complained in dissent, it
did so by "fragmenting the standing inquiry and imposing a
separate standing hurdle with respect to each form of relief
sought," 9 so that the injury sufficient to permit standing
for damages was insufficient to permit standing for an
injunction. It also did so in its characterization of the injury
itself: fragmenting Lyons' own interests into individualized
rather than communitarian concerns. Although the
imposition of separate standing hurdles for equitable and
damage relief was entirely unprecedented, 9 the Court
393. See id. at 236.
394. See Lenore M. Lapidus, Maintaining the Status Quo: Institutional
Obstacles in a Child Custody Dispute, in LAw STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha
Minow eds., 1996); Bandes, Negative Constitution,supranote 333, at 2283-85.
395. See COVER, supranote 306, at 224.
396. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
397. See COVER, supra note 306, at 199.
398. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
399. See Richard A. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,Remedies, and Public Law
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portrayed itself as choiceless. 4°0 Robert Cover might describe
this kind of judicial decision-making as "bowing out of duty
to law to crystal clear demands," "on the
basis of unclear
40
and sometimes contradictory authority." '
The retreat to mechanistic formalism is itself a means
of denying responsibility, but it was not the only one
employed by the Lyons court. The Court went on to invoke
federalism, shifting the responsibility to the state courts to
fix the problem. 42 But of course the state courts have their
own notions of mechanistic formalism, such as legal
reasoning of the sort that finds a legally significant
difference between placing a shotgun or a revolver in the
mouth of a suspect in a game of Russian Roulette. And they
have their own ways of shifting responsibility, including
waiver, harmless error, and deference to the trial court's
findings.
III. CONCLUSION

The courts, like all the other institutions that have
allowed police brutality to flourish, seem to believe that
inaction is not only an option, but an ethically neutral
one-a choice to opt out of the whole unpleasant situation.
Or perhaps, on some levels, these institutions have made a
choice, and are comfortable with it. The decision to
maintain the status quo is unlikely to be made by police, or
even judges, in a vacuum. Much of the police brutality
literature suggests that many societal forces converge to
encourage the existing order. To the extent that low level
police officers, unhindered or condoned by supervisors, the
chief, the local political structure, and the courts, are
brutalizing minority residents of poor neighborhoods, it
may be that these actions are part of an implicit bargain
with society-at least that part of society that has political
and economic power. Such brutality is often implicitly
Litigation: Notes on The Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1984).
400. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (describing its holding as dictated by
requisites for equitable relief).
401. COVER, supranote 306, at 230-32. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.
402. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113. The court noted that "[tlhe individual
states may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the conduct of law
enforcement authorities on a continuing basis" but that this was not a role for
the courts. Id. at 112.
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approved by majority residents of stratified, segregated
societies who value law and order, who want the boundaries
between black and white neighborhoods policed, and who
will put up with the infliction of a substantial amount of
brutalit on others as long as it is not made impossible to
ignore.4 The treatment of police brutality as aberrational
and anecdotal is an essential though largely invisible part
of the bargain.

403. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Behind Police Brutality: Public Assent, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 21, 1999, § 4, at 1 (reporting that though most Americans decry
flagrant episodes, many have tacitly blessed a more vigorous, belligerent brand
of policing, which is often difficult to distinguish from the unduly brutal or
abusive).

